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CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL  
PETER B. RUTLEDGE 
This paper examines both the theoretical underpinnings and empirical 
picture of procedural contracts.  Procedural contracts may be understood 
as contracts in which parties regulate not merely their commercial 
relations but also the procedures by which disputes over those relations 
will be resolved.  Those procedural contracts regulate not simply the 
forum in which disputes will be resolved (arbitration vs. litigation) but 
also the applicable procedural framework (discovery, class action 
waivers, remedies limitations, etc.).  At a theoretical level, this paper 
explores both the limits on parties’ ability to regulate procedure by 
contract (at issue in the Supreme Court's recent Rent-A-Center decision) 
and the scope of an arbitrator’s ability to fill gaps in parties’ procedural 
contracts (at issue in the Supreme Court’s recent Stolt-Nielsen decision).  
At an empirical level, this paper taps a largely unexplored database of 
credit card contracts available from the Federal Reserve in order to 
examine actual practices in the use of procedural contracts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Fifteen years ago, in their seminal article Contract and Jurisdiction, 
Paul Carrington and Paul Haagen lamented the explosion of devices 
that manipulated jurisdiction by contract.  In their view, various devices, 
including forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses, enabled 
sophisticated parties to lock-in significant tactical advantages (especially 
over their less sophisticated counter-parties) through the enforceable 
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designation of an exclusive forum before a dispute ever arose.1  While 
Carrington’s and Haagen’s lament garnered significant academic 
support,2 judicial tides turned in the other direction.  Courts largely 
accepted these contractual forum selection devices, subject to a narrow 
range of exceptions.3  Although the authors’ critique has recently gained 
new traction in legislative corridors,4 including most recently the 2010 
financial reform law,5 it is no exaggeration to say that, with little 
exception, parties presently can largely control jurisdiction by contract. 
If judicial battles over contract and jurisdiction have subsided, the 
larger contest is far from over.  Rather, we have entered an era in which 
the battles are fought not over parties’ ability to control jurisdiction by 
contract but, instead, over their ability to control procedure by contract.  
In her important article, Procedure as Contract, Judith Resnik identified 
one manifestation of this modern phenomenon—bargaining over 
procedural rights after litigation commences (such as vacatur of orders 
following settlement).6  Here, we address a related but underexplored 
manifestation—bargaining over procedural rights even before a dispute 
arises, a form of bargaining catalyzed by the judicial acceptance of 
 
1.  See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 351–61. 
2.  See, e.g., Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution 
in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 passim (2002); Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  
Toward a State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577 passim 
(1997); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Theory and Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 1335 passim (1996); Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of 
the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, 
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1 passim (1997). 
3.  See, e.g., Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable); Richardson v. Palm 
Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that arbitration agreements 
are presumptively enforceable); Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(holding that forum selection clauses are presumptively enforceable); Harris v. Green Tree 
Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that arbitration agreements are 
presumptively enforceable). 
4.  See 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, § 11028, 116 Stat. 1758, 1835–36 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006)); John 
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 
§ 670(a), 120 Stat. 2083, 2266 (amending 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006)); Food, Conservation, 
and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No 110-246, § 11005, 122 Stat. 1651, 2119 (codified at 7 
U.S.C. § 197c(a) (Supp. III 2007–2010)); Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, 
Pub L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2010) (“Franken Amendment”).  
5.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 921, 1028, 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 2003–04, 2151 (2010).  
6.  Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 650 (2005). 
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arbitration over the last several decades.7  We refer to such pre-dispute 
agreements as “procedural contracts.” 
“Procedural contracts” take various forms.  They may incorporate 
by reference the rules of arbitral institutions, which, in Resnik’s terms, 
function like “mini-codes of civil procedure.”8  Alternatively (and 
increasingly), they also may be explicit terms of the parties’ contract, 
decoupled from the rules of an administering institution.  Because the 
rules of most arbitral institutions operate as default rules that can be 
overridden by the express terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement—
subject to the willingness of institutions to administer arbitrations under 
the agreed terms9—these explicit terms represent private procedural 
codes that arbitrators are duty-bound to apply unless they (or courts) 
declare them unenforceable. 
The terms of procedural contracts vary widely.  One current, hotly 
contested term is a prospective waiver of the ability to pursue a claim on 
a class wide basis.10  When these waivers seek to preclude class actions in 
court, they are known as “class-action waivers”; when they seek to 
preclude arbitration from proceeding on a class wide basis, they are 
 
7.  Others have examined the ability to customize the litigation process by contract.  See, 
e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure 
Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, 
Another Choice of Law:  Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 291 (1988); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to 
Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 579 
(2007); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 
YALE L.J. 814, 856–78 (2006); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 
181; see also David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised History of Forum 
Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973 (2008).  In the context of 
arbitration agreements, a few articles have addressed procedural contracts though without the 
degree of empirical evidence or normative argument we address here.  See David Horton, 
Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 41–53, on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Horton, Arbitration as Delegation]; available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1665565 (arguing that FAA was an unconstitutional delegation of 
procedural rule-making authority); David Horton, The Shadow Terms:  Contract Procedure 
and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 646–53 (2010) (opposing unilateral 
modification of the procedural terms of arbitration clauses) [hereinafter Horton, The Shadow 
Terms]; Meredith R. Miller, Contracting out of Process, Contracting out of Corporate 
Accountability:  An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 
TENN. L. REV. 365, 371 (2008) (opposing procedural contracts in arbitration agreements). 
8.  Resnik, supra note 6, at 597. 
9.  See the discussion of the Due Process Protocols, infra text accompanying note 71.  
10.  For an insightful discussion of the developments in this area, see generally Richard 
A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 1–2, on file with authors), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1670722. 
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known as “class-arbitration waivers.”11  Examples of other terms include 
contractual limits on the availability of discovery, contractually imposed 
limitations periods, formulas allocating dispute resolution costs, 
limitations on remedies, provisions reallocating the power to assess the 
enforceability of an arbitration agreement, and efforts to alter the 
standard of judicial review of an arbitration award.12 
Viewing these developments through the lens of contract enables us 
to tap into the rich literature on contract theory and, thereby, facilitates 
systematic thinking about procedural contracts.  As with any agreement, 
procedural contracts raise important questions, both positive and 
normative.  Positive questions include: To what extent do parties 
actually attempt to regulate their disputes through procedural contracts?  
Why do parties sometimes leave particular procedural questions 
unresolved in their contracts despite incentives to address them?  When 
a procedural contract is silent as to a particular matter, how do decision 
makers (such as arbitrators) fill the gap?13  Normative questions include: 
Should there be limits on parties’ freedom to enter into procedural 
contracts?  Assuming that limits should exist, what blend of oversight 
achieves the optimal degree of regulation?  What are the limits on 
arbitrators’ authority to fill the gaps in procedural contracts?  What is 
the proper role of courts in policing arbitrators’ gap-filling authority? 
The answers to these questions implicate important stakes.  For 
example, critics of class-action and class-arbitration waivers argue that 
these waivers can operate as exculpatory clauses,14  effectively 
eliminating any incentive for individual litigants to bring lawsuits when 
their damages are nugatory.  By contrast, defenders argue that they 
represent an invaluable tool to control the runaway costs of aggregate 
litigation and, by reducing a company’s expected dispute resolution 
 
11.  See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of 
the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 376 n.15 (2005) (distinguishing between 
“collective action waivers” and “class action waivers”). 
12.  See Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial 
Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative Solutions to the Unsettled Legal 
Landscape, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 504 (2009); Miller, supra note 7, at 381–99 
(discussing use of collective action waivers, limits on discovery, and shorter limitations 
periods). 
13.  This assumes, of course, that silence in a procedural contract is properly 
conceptualized as a gap that the arbitrator is authorized to fill (as opposed to a deliberate 
omission designed to strip the arbitrator of the power to enter a particular procedural order).  
We address this idea in greater detail in Part III, infra. 
14.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 157, 169 (2006); Miller, supra note 7, at 367–68. 
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costs, benefit individuals in the form of lower prices (or, in the context 
of employment contracts, higher wages).15  In light of these deep 
underlying policy disagreements, courts unsurprisingly have reached 
conflicting conclusions over the enforceability of procedural contracts 
containing these terms.16 
For similar reasons, procedural contracts have caught the Supreme 
Court’s attention in recent years.  The current era of the Court’s 
jurisprudence on procedural contracts can be traced to the Court’s 1995 
decision in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, which addressed the 
parties’ ability to allocate contractually the power to determine the 
enforceability of an arbitration clause.17  More recently, two decisions 
from October Term 2009 have tackled additional issues in the law 
governing procedural contracts.  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 
building on First Options, addressed whether a court has the power to 
rule on an unconscionability challenge to an arbitration agreement even 
when the parties’ contract vests that power in the arbitrator.18  Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. addressed whether the 
arbitrator can order class arbitration when the arbitration agreement 
neither explicitly authorizes nor explicitly prohibits such a device.19 
Using Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen as the springboards for our 
discussion, we undertake a systematic examination of the positive and 
normative questions underpinning procedural contracts.20  In brief, our 
 
15.  See Stephen J. Ware, The Case For Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements—
with Particular Consideration of Class Actions and Arbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 253–54 
(2006). 
16.  See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs. Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding 
class arbitration waiver unenforceable because it precludes claimants from vindicating their 
statutory rights); Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v. AT&T, 
319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding class arbitration waiver unconscionable); 
Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless 
LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274–75 (Ill. 2006). 
17.  514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).  Others date the incentive to design procedural contracts to 
the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Bazzle.  See Miller, supra note 7, at 374.  But we believe 
that First Options created the necessary conditions nearly a decade earlier and believe that 
the empirical research offered here supports that view.  See infra note 35 and accompanying 
text.  
18.  130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010). 
19.  130 S. Ct. 1758, 1764 (2010).  This article was already in press when the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in Concepcion.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (2011).  Although we reserve detailed analysis of Concepcion for future work, we do 
note that the Court’s decision is consistent with our analysis here.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 225–27. 
20.  For an excellent analysis of the decisions in Rent-A-Center and Stolt-Nielsen, see 
generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, Revelation and Reaction: The Struggle to Shape American 
10. DRAHOZAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:23 PM 
2011] CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE 1109 
argument consists of four propositions: 
 
 First, parties, particularly sophisticated parties drafting form 
contracts with unsophisticated parties, are increasingly entering 
into procedural contracts. (Hereinafter we call this the exercise 
of “procedural contractual freedom.”)  Over time, the terms of 
these procedural contracts are becoming more detailed, 
although interesting variations appear in the use of certain 
terms.  For example, while the use of class-arbitration waivers 
has grown, the use of discovery limits remains surprisingly 
static. 
 Second, while a variety of mechanisms might be used to 
regulate procedural contracts, a blend of private self-regulation 
and case-by-case judicial oversight likely offers the optimal 
regime.  We evaluate this regime as compared to more 
paternalistic forms of regulation such as oversight by 
administrative agencies or outright statutory bans. 
 Third, arbitrators have not developed a consistent method for 
determining how to fill procedural gaps—such as the 
availability of class relief—in arbitration. 
 Fourth, while perhaps adopting the correct gap-filler in Stolt-
Nielsen, the Supreme Court overstepped in that case when it 
trimmed arbitrators’ gap-filling authority to render procedural 
rulings in the face of silent agreements. 
 
This argument unfolds in three parts.  Part I surveys the history of 
procedural contracts.  It then turns to the empirical record, examining 
data on changes in franchise arbitration clauses over time to illustrate 
how some procedural contracts have evolved.  Finally, Part I examines 
why some parties, even when presented with this opportunity, have 
declined to undertake it. 
Part II examines the theoretical issues at the core of Rent-A-
Center—namely the scope of parties’ freedom to enter into procedural 
contracts.  Rent-A-Center concerned the use of a particular term that 
allocates to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve challenges 
to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement. Part II draws on 
several data sources, including one that, to our knowledge, has not 
 
Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers forthcoming 2011). 
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previously been examined in the arbitration literature—namely the 
Federal Reserve Board’s recently created and incredibly rich database 
of credit card agreements, set up under the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009,21 to examine the frequency 
with which parties employ this term across different types of 
agreements.  It also examines the potential impact of Rent-A-Center for 
a wider array of arbitration agreements that do not explicitly reallocate 
the power to rule on the enforceability of the arbitration agreement but 
arguably do so implicitly through incorporation of arbitral rules.  Part II 
then turns to the normative question lying at the heart of Rent-A-
Center—namely the proper limits on procedural contractual freedom.  It 
introduces several possible models—including self-regulation, judicial 
oversight, administrative regulation, and legislative action.  It defends a 
blend of self-regulation and case-by-case judicial oversight as the 
optimal form of regulation and responds to several potential objections 
to this approach. 
Part III examines the theoretical issues at the core of Stolt-Nielsen—
namely how arbitrators fill gaps in the parties’ procedural contract.  
Stolt-Nielsen concerned a particular type of gap—the agreement’s 
silence as to the availability of class arbitration.  Examining awards in 
class arbitrations administered by American Arbitration Association, 
Part III finds that arbitrators have not developed a consistent method 
for filling procedural gaps in an arbitration agreement when the 
agreement does not expressly address class arbitration.  Part III then 
turns to the normative question lying at the heart of Stolt-Nielsen—the 
proper scope of an arbitrator’s gap-filling authority.  We argue that the 
Court took too crabbed a view of the arbitrator’s gap-filling authority.  
After examining the implications of the Court’s decision beyond the 
issue of class arbitration, we urge courts to construe the decision 
narrowly in order to reaffirm a more deferential approach to an 
arbitrator’s gap-filling authority. 
The conclusion explores the implications of this analysis for issues 
currently before the Court and Congress.  As to the judicial agenda, the 
grant of certiorari (and recent decision) in AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion signals the Court’s continued interest in procedural 
contracts.22  Concepcion presents difficult issues of FAA preemption and 
highlights the interaction between procedural contract freedom and 
 
21.  Pub. L. No. 111-24, 123 Stat. 1734 (2009). 
22.  Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted sub nom. 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010).   
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judicial oversight—themes central to our analysis.  Our analysis suggests 
that the issue was more difficult than the majority admitted but, 
ultimately, supports the majority’s conclusion that the FAA preempts 
judicial doctrines finding arbitration clauses unconscionable based on 
the mere presence of a class-arbitration waiver.  As to the Congressional 
agenda, several recent enactments and pending bills signal a continued 
legislative interest in procedural contracts.  The recently enacted 
financial reform bill prohibits arbitration of certain claims created by the 
statute and authorizes several federal agencies (including the newly 
created Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection) to prohibit or 
regulate arbitration agreements in certain industries.23  Even more 
sweepingly, the Arbitration Fairness Act would completely prohibit pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in consumer and employment contracts.24  
Our analysis suggests that Congress may have acted hastily when it 
adopted the anti-arbitration provisions in the financial reform bill and 
should proceed cautiously before further restricting procedural 
contractual freedom. 
II.  PROCEDURAL CONTRACTS: HISTORY AND TRENDS 
This part does two things.  First, it examines the history of efforts to 
control procedure through contract.  Second, it provides an empirical 
snapshot of the trends in efforts to control procedure through contract. 
A.  History 
The history of contract and procedure in the United States can be 
divided into three eras: (1) prior to the FAA’s enactment (until 1925), 
(2) following the FAA’s enactment during the era of non-arbitrability 
(from 1925 until the mid-1980s), and (3) following the demise of the 
non-arbitrability doctrine until the present day (from the mid-1980s to 
the present day).25 
 
23.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§§ 921, 1028, 1414(e), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841, 2003–04, 2151 (2010). 
24.  See S. 987, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. § 3 (2011). 
25.  For alternative surveys of the history, see Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, 
at 611–23; Marcus, supra note 7, at 988–1015.  We acknowledge that the second era may be 
appropriately dated to the early 1970s when decisions like Bremen and Scherck laid the 
intellectual groundwork for the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine.  See Carrington & 
Haagen, supra note 1, at 352, 364.  Nonetheless, we date the end of the second era at the 
middle of the 1980s, for that is when the “international commerce” rationale for Bremen and 
Scherck dropped out, and their underlying principles crept into purely domestic disputes.  
That was the critical move which enabled procedural contracts to proliferate.  See Resnik, 
supra note 6, at 620. 
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1.  Pre-1925 
Prior to the twentieth century, opportunities to control procedure by 
contract were largely non-existent.  Courts viewed such pre-dispute 
agreements (whether forum selection clauses or arbitration clauses) with 
suspicion, characterizing them as contracts that sought to “oust” courts 
of jurisdiction and, consequently, violated public policy.26  During this 
era, a party could control procedure only through forum shopping.  By 
filing a case in a particular forum (or seeking to have a case removed or 
transferred to another forum), a party could influence the procedural 
rules governing the dispute. 
This type of crude procedural manipulation via forum shopping 
differed from the sorts of devices described in the introduction (like 
class-arbitration waivers) in two critical respects.  First, parties enjoyed 
far less autonomy—while they might choose from among different 
systems of procedure (by, for example, filing in state court rather than 
federal court), they had relatively little influence over the procedures 
within a particular forum.  Second, the decision over the applicable 
procedure was not the result of pre-dispute bargaining between the 
parties.  Except in a rare case where one party chose not to object to its 
adversary’s chosen forum, the applicable procedures for a dispute were 
more the product of one party’s prevailing in a forum-shopping fight 
than the product of a bilateral agreement between disputants. 
2.  The Non-Arbitrability Era 
The enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act and the growing 
judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses expanded opportunities 
for controlling procedure through contract, but doctrines continued to 
impose constraints.  By putting arbitration agreements on the same 
footing as contracts generally, the Federal Arbitration Act heralded the 
possibility that parties, on a pre-dispute basis, could remove their 
disputes from the courts and resolve them instead before private bodies.  
To the extent the rules of those bodies allowed parties to design the 
system for resolving disputes, the Federal Arbitration Act created the 
possibility for parties to control procedure contractually too. 
Yet the nonarbitrability doctrine supplied an important constraint 
on this newfound power.  Under that doctrine, many disputes arising 
under federal statutes such as the securities laws, the antitrust laws, and 
 
26.  For a fuller discussion of this era, see Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 339–44; 
Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 552 (2008). 
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the civil rights laws were deemed to be nonarbitrable.27  The underlying 
theory was that arbitration of such disputes was inconsistent with 
Congress’s intent in creating a cause of action under those statutes.  
Consequently, claims arising under those laws would remain in court, 
where opportunities to influence procedure by contract remained 
limited, not unlike the prior era when contractual forum clauses were 
altogether unenforceable. 
This bifurcation of arbitral disputes and nonarbitrable ones—which 
largely prevailed from 1925 (the year of the FAA’s enactment) until the 
1970s and 1980s (when the nonarbitrability doctrine began to 
crumble)—had important consequences.  Specifically, it meant that the 
parties exercised their newfound power to contract for procedure 
around particular types of claims, namely contract, tort, and other 
common-law claims that did not run afoul of the nonarbitrability 
doctrine’s limits.  To the extent federal statutory claims presented 
unique procedural challenges (on matters such as attorneys’ fees, 
discovery, and class actions), parties had no incentive to invest much 
time or attention in these matters. 
3.  Demise of the Non-Arbitrability Doctrine 
Things changed in the 1970s and 1980s as the nonarbitrability 
doctrine crumbled, and most claims (including federal statutory ones) 
became arbitrable.28  The opportunities to control procedure by contract 
expanded.  The proliferation in the types of arbitrable claims created 
greater opportunities to regulate procedure by contract.  To the extent 
these newly arbitrable claims presented unique procedural challenges 
(for example, class actions, attorney’s fees, discovery), parties now had 
an incentive—which they lacked in the earlier era that limited 
arbitration to nonstatutory claims—to use their new contractual 
freedom to regulate such matters. 
  
 
27.  E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (“[W]e decide that the intention of 
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid such an 
agreement for arbitration . . . .”). 
28.  In addition to the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine, the scope of Congress’s 
power to regulate interstate commerce expanded dramatically from 1925, when the FAA was 
enacted, to the 1970s and 1980s.  This expansion correspondingly increased the contracts to 
which the FAA applied.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:  
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
101, 127–30 (2002). 
10. DRAHOZAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:23 PM 
1114 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [94:1103 
The steady erosion in the non-arbitrability doctrine paralleled the 
Court’s growing judicial acceptance of forum selection clauses.29  While 
these two strands of jurisprudence shared a common solicitude for 
freedom of contract, their implications differed sharply.  Enforceable 
forum selection clauses enhanced parties’ abilities to site a case in a 
court that had a favorable set of procedural rules (much like the crude 
form of forum shopping described above) and, unlike that crude system, 
enabled explicit pre-dispute bargaining over that forum.  Once that 
forum was fixed contractually, however, most rules of civil procedure 
limited the parties’ ability to contract around its provisions.  (To borrow 
a gastronomic analogy, a party might pick from among several 
restaurants but could not control what would be on the menu.) 
In contrast to forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses have a 
more profound effect on the procedure by which disputes are resolved.  
Unlike rules of civil procedure, which function largely like mandatory 
rules (around which parties cannot contract), most arbitral rules 
function like default rules (generally subject only to the mandatory rules 
of the arbitral forum).  They generally provide that the arbitrator will 
conduct the proceedings in a manner consistent with the parties’ 
agreement and, only when such agreement is lacking, may exercise his 
or her discretion.  To the extent arbitral rules regulate some aspect of an 
arbitration, they often also contain a provision stating that the rules can 
be modified by the agreement of the parties.  The net effect of such 
rules, which have no perfect analogue in most rules of civil procedure 
for court systems, is to create far greater potential for parties to regulate 
by contract the procedures by which their dispute will be resolved.30 
This newfound opportunity to control procedure by contract has 
raised a host of challenging questions for the Supreme Court.  Some 
questions concern the limits on the parties’ freedom of contract.  In 
addition to Rent-A-Center, cases like Gilmer (involving a broadside 
 
29.  See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594 (1991); Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1972). 
30.  We stress no “perfect” analogue because certain features of garden-variety civil 
litigation are subject to agreement by the parties.  For example, parties may enter into joint 
stipulations under which they agree to fashion discovery along certain lines, or they may 
agree on certain substantive questions, thereby eliminating the need for jury determination.  
The critical difference between these devices and the devices that we describe here is that 
procedural contracts like joint stipulations occur after the dispute has arisen (where both 
parties have more information about the nature of the dispute) whereas the devices that 
interest us here can be designed at the pre-dispute stage (where parties have relatively less 
information about the course of any dispute).  For a thoughtful analysis of this “relatively 
unexplored” field, see Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 857–78. 
10. DRAHOZAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:23 PM 
2011] CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE 1115 
attack on arbitral procedures), Randolph (involving the enforceability of 
fee-splitting rules in arbitration), and Hall Street (involving the 
enforceability of contractually expanded judicial review of awards)31 fall 
in this category.32  A separate set of questions concerns the proper 
default rules where the parties’ contract is silent.  In addition to Stolt-
Nielsen, cases like First Options (involving the default allocation of 
authority between courts and arbitrators), Howsam (involving the 
allocation of authority to decide whether limitations periods have 
lapsed), Cardegna (involving the default allocation of authority to 
decide legality challenges to the underlying contract) and Bazzle (like 
Stolt-Nielsen, involving an agreement that was silent about the 
availability of class arbitration) fall into this category.33  We return to 
these themes in Parts II and III.  For now, we simply wish to lay out how 
doctrinal evolutions enabled these current battles over procedure by 
contract.  In the remainder of this Section, we show empirically how 
parties are exercising this freedom and also consider explanations for 
why parties sometimes fail to do so. 
B.  Trends 
The preceding subsection explained how the Court’s doctrine has 
evolved so as to create conditions under which parties could—and, 
indeed, had an incentive to—control procedure by contract.34  Here, we 
examine the extent to which parties have responded to those 
incentives.35  Our hypothesis is that over time, arbitration clauses, 
 
31.  Expanded review, however, unlike the other issues, is new only in the form it takes—
i.e., clauses drafted specifying the grounds courts were to apply in reviewing arbitration 
awards.  An alternative form of expanded review—restricting the arbitrators’ authority to 
make errors of law—has been around for a long time, and, indeed, predates enactment of the 
FAA.  See Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 905, 914–15 (2010). 
32.  See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008); Green Tree 
Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 29–33 (1991). 
33.  Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Green Tree Fin. 
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 
79, 83 (2002); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995). 
34.  For an explanation of why parties choose arbitration as an option generally, see 
generally Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and 
Arbitration:  An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003); 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433 (2010); Richard A. Posner, The 
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581 (2005). 
35.  During oral argument in Bazzle, Justice Stevens predicted that the Court’s view on 
an arbitrator’s authority to order class arbitration lacked “any real future significance, 
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particularly in contracts between sophisticated and unsophisticated 
parties, have become more complex, seeking to regulate the procedure 
in arbitration in more and more detail. 
The empirical evidence tracking changes in arbitration clauses over 
time is limited.  Most studies examine the provisions of arbitration 
clauses at a particular point in time, rather than measuring changes in 
those provisions over time.  One exception is data on the terms of 
arbitration clauses in franchise agreements in 1999 and 2007, as reported 
by Drahozal and Wittrock.36  The sample consists of 28 form franchise 
agreements, filed by franchisors with the Minnesota Department of 
Commerce and collected in 1999 and 2007, that included an arbitration 
clause in both years.  A clear advantage of the dataset is that it examines 
the same franchisors in each year, enabling a comparison of changes in 
the arbitration clauses over time. 
Franchise agreements, of course, are only one type of contract, and 
they are not necessarily representative of other types of contracts, such 
as, for example, employment, consumer, and business contracts.  Thus, 
franchisees, unlike consumers and most employees, are running 
businesses, albeit often (although not always) small businesses.  
Conversely, franchise agreements typically are standard form contracts 
presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—i.e., are not fully negotiable 
between the franchisor and the franchisee.  Moreover, the timing of the 
dataset is not perfect.  We would expect to see the move to more 
detailed arbitration clauses to have begun before 1999, so if anything 
our results likely understate the degree of change in terms.  With those 
qualifications, Table 1 summarizes the results.37 
  
 
because isn’t it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will prohibit class 
actions?”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 
(2003) (No. 02-634).  In fact, the empirical results of our research suggest that, more broadly, 
this sort of procedural contracting was already well underway by the time of Bazzle, but that, 
conversely, it has not become ubiquitous, as Stevens suggested. 
36.  Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration? 
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 90–94 (2008).  
37.  Id. at 103 tbl.8, 104 tbl.9, 106 tbl.10, 108 tbl.11, 110 tbl.12, 111 tbl.13, 112 tbl.14, 113 
tbl.15.  Bold type highlights those types of contract provisions that are more common in 2007 
than in 1999. 
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Table 1. Percentage of Franchise Agreements that Include Specified  
Provisions in Arbitration Clauses (n=28) 
 1999 2007 
Number of arbitrators 50.0% 60.7% 
Discovery 21.4% 21.4% 
Judicial review 10.7% 10.7% 
Class arbitration or consolidation 64.3% 89.3% 
Location 96.4% 96.4% 
Costs 75.0% 85.7% 
Time limits for filing claims 42.9% 67.9% 
Restrictions on punitive damages 75.0% 85.7% 
 
Table 1 illustrates several important findings: 
Dispute resolution clauses in the franchise agreements in the sample 
have become more detailed.  Tellingly, in no procedural category did we 
see a decline in the percentage of arbitration agreements regulating the 
matter.  This is consistent with our hypothesis that this current era of 
contract and procedure has enhanced opportunities for sophisticated 
parties to regulate the procedures by which disputes are settled. 
The greatest increase in procedural terms comes in the use of class-
arbitration waivers and time limits.  This suggests that control over those 
mechanisms has grown in importance to the franchisor community, 
which tracks what we’ve seen in the business community’s views of class 
actions more generally over the last several decades.  More modest 
increases are seen in provisions controlling the allocation of costs and 
awards of punitive damages, which were among the more important 
advantages of arbitration to businesses immediately following the 
decline of the non-arbitrability era. 
Some provisions such as discovery limits are more static over time.  
This is curious because reduced discovery is often cited as among the 
more appealing features of arbitration.38  So why might this occur?  
Several preliminary hypotheses are possible. 
One reason may simply be ignorance.  Until parties become 
accustomed to the opportunities enabled by arbitration clauses, they 
may have little incentive to invest in sophisticated forms. 
 
38.  See Rutledge, supra note 26, at 575.  
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Another reason may be fear of non-enforceability.  With growing 
reliance on unconscionability (and other) doctrines as a tool for resisting 
enforcement of arbitration clauses, parties favoring arbitration may be 
reluctant to build too many procedural advantages into an arbitration 
clause for fear of jeopardizing its enforceability.39 
A third reason may be incomplete information.  At the time parties 
draft (and enter into) arbitration agreements, they may be unable to 
predict with sufficient certainty the expected course of a dispute.  
Consequently, they may be reluctant to tie their hands over the 
availability (or unavailability) of a particular procedural right, for fear 
that in a particular dispute they indeed may want access to that right. 
A fourth, slightly more cynical reason may be principal-agent 
problems.  Lawyers drafting arbitration clauses on behalf of their clients 
may have an incentive to leave certain procedural terms (like discovery) 
vague.40  The advantage from the agent’s perspective is that the vague 
term creates the conditions in which disputes over gap-filling inevitably 
will arise.  Those disputes translate into increased fees for the attorney.  
The difficulty with this explanation, it must be noted, is that it is difficult 
to explain the variation across procedural terms—by logic of this 
argument, the attorney would have the incentive to leave other terms 
(like class arbitration) unresolved as well, yet the evidence suggests they 
have not done so. 
A final reason may be transaction costs.  To the extent parties have 
equal (or approximately equal) sophistication, more detailed procedural 
contracts potentially become more costly, as each party has a negotiable 
stake in the bargain.  Consistent with the literature on incompletely 
theorized agreements,41 one would expect more detailed arbitration 
clauses where relatively significant differences in bargaining positions 
exist and relatively less detailed clauses among parties with similar 
bargaining positions.  In Scott and Triantis’s terms, the negotiation of 
procedural contracts between parties of relatively equal bargaining 
 
39.  Where courts find an arbitration clause unenforceable on these grounds, that 
determination raises a corollary question whether the offending provision is severable or, 
instead, the entire arbitration clause is invalid.  See Miller, supra note 7, at 379–80.  For a 
good example of severability analysis, see Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005). 
40.  This hypothesis presupposes, of course, that an outside counsel either drafted the 
clause or was consulted by the company about how best to draft the clause.  The database 
does not permit independent verification of this premise. 
41.  See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1733 (1995). 
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power entails relatively greater “front-end costs as transaction costs” 
than procedural contracts between parties of relatively unequal 
bargaining power.42  It bears emphasis that each of the foregoing 
explanations merely amounts to a hypothesis.  The available data do not 
permit a firm testing of the various hypotheses. 
This Part has examined both the history of procedural contracts and 
the empirical record.  The history demonstrates that the demise of the 
non-arbitrability doctrine has created unprecedented opportunities for 
parties to regulate procedural rights on a pre-dispute basis.  It has given 
them an incentive to design far more elaborate procedural contracts 
than during the era when only garden-variety contract claims were 
arbitrable.  The empirical record provides evidence that at least some 
parties are increasingly exercising their procedural contractual freedom 
to enter into elaborate agreements regulating the procedure by which 
their dispute will be resolved.  Over time, the most significant 
movement has been an increase in the use of class-arbitration waivers 
and contractual limitations periods.  Curiously though, discovery has 
consistently been left unregulated, despite the potential for parties to 
control the costs of discovery through contractual terms.  While several 
possible hypotheses might explain this curious phenomenon, the 
necessary data are not yet available to test them.  This remains a fertile 
area for future research. 
III.  WHEN THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT SPEAKS— 
LIMITS ON FREEDOM 
This Part addresses the scope and limits of parties’ procedural 
contractual freedom, the issue at the core of Rent-A-Center.43  After 
laying out the particular contract term at issue in Rent-A-Center—one 
that allocated to the arbitrator the exclusive authority to resolve 
challenges to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement 
(hereinafter a “delegation provision”)—it canvasses several data sources 
to determine how frequently parties use delegation provisions.  It then 
takes another cut at the data to examine how parties might achieve the 
same results as a delegation provision, but through indirect means.  This 
Part then turns to the normative question at the core of Rent-A-
Center—namely the limits on the parties’ ability to exercise their 
procedural contractual freedom.  After introducing several potential 
 
42.  See Scott & Triantis, supra note 7, at 823. 
43.  We disclose that one of us (Drahozal) provided comments on a draft of the 
arbitration scholars’ brief in Rent-A-Center, but was not a party to the brief.   
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models of regulation, we defend an approach that relies on a blend of 
industry self-regulation (through the use of tools like the due process 
protocols) and case-by-case judicial oversight.  This Part concludes by 
anticipating and responding to several potential criticisms of this 
approach. 
A.  Procedural Contractual Freedom: The Case of Delegation Clauses 
The facts of Rent-A-Center illustrate well our point about how 
sophisticated parties utilize arbitration clauses to control procedures by 
contract.  In that case, Rent-A-Center required its prospective 
employees, as a condition of employment, to sign a separate five-page 
arbitration agreement.  Among other things, that five-page agreement 
required the parties to split the arbitration fees and limited the parties’ 
ability to conduct discovery.44  It also allocated to the arbitrator the 
“exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation, 
applicability, enforceability or formation of [the arbitration agreement] 
including, but not limited to any claim that all or any part of [the 
arbitration agreement] is void or voidable.”45 
This last provision was central to the question before the Supreme 
Court.  In light of this provision, who resolved challenges to the 
unconscionability of the arbitration agreement?  The arbitrator or the 
court?  The answer might have turned on a straightforward 
interpretation of First Options—specifically, whether the quoted 
provision provided the necessary evidence of “clear and unmistakable” 
intent to allocate the decision to the arbitrator. 
While the dissent answered this question with an unambiguous 
“no,”46 the majority constructed an entirely novel and unanticipated 
theory to resolve the case—one neither advanced by the parties nor 
considered by the courts below.  Instead of simply answering the 
question “yes,” the majority reconceptualized the arbitration 
agreement.  Rather than treating the arbitration agreement as a single 
procedural contract, it described the agreement as embodying two 
separate contracts—(1) a contract to arbitrate the parties’ substantive 
claims (that is, those arising out of the employment relationship) (“the 
arbitration agreement”) and (2) a separate procedural contract to 
allocate to the arbitrator the power to resolve challenges to the 
arbitration agreement (dubbed “the delegation provision” by the 
 
44.  Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2780 (2010). 
45.  Id. at 2775. 
46.  Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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majority).  In the majority’s view, since Jackson’s unconscionability 
challenge was directed only at the first contract (the arbitration 
agreement) and not the second, the challenge was appropriately 
resolved by the arbitrator, not the court.47 
This conclusion marked a significant expansion of the “separability” 
principle—a principle first announced by the Court in Prima Paint and 
one that has become a cornerstone of arbitration, both domestically and 
internationally.48  As formulated by Prima Paint over four decades 
earlier, the separability doctrine treats an arbitration clause as a 
separate contract from the main contract that includes the arbitration 
clause.  Separability permitted the development of a default rule for 
allocation of authority.  Under that default rule, courts resolve 
challenges to the enforceability of arbitration agreements and 
arbitrators resolve challenges to the enforceability of the underlying 
substantive contract.49  Rent-A-Center extended the separability 
principle by treating the arbitration agreement itself as entailing two 
separate contracts.  This double separability principle enabled a further 
allocation of power to the arbitrator—now arbitrators could resolve 
challenges to the arbitration agreement, and courts retained only the 
competence to resolve challenges directed specifically at the delegation 
provision. 
This extension of the separability doctrine marks a substantial 
development toward a model of arbitration that allows parties a great 
deal of procedural contractual freedom (and a concomitant reduction in 
a court’s role to police procedural contracts).  While the facts of Rent-A-
Center are somewhat unusual (as the case involves a separate, detailed 
arbitration agreement), the decision logically extends to a case where 
the arbitration agreement is merely a clause within a broader contract 
(as is often the case, for example, in franchise or consumer credit 
agreements).  The case thus gives rise to the possibility that a single 
document qua agreement will be legally understood to contain at least 
three separate contracts: (1) the underlying substantive commitments 
 
47.  Id. at 2779 (majority opinion). 
48.  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402 (1967); see 
also Alan Scott Rau, Everything You Really Need to Know about “Separability” in Seventeen 
Simple Propositions, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 81 & n.193 (2003) (stating that “every 
modern regime of arbitration—if not indeed every piece of legislation in the civilized world—
takes separability as the foundation stone of the entire structure,” although recognizing 
limited exceptions). 
49.  This statement of the rule is subject to an important qualification.  See infra note 50 
and accompanying text. 
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(for example, a cell phone for a monthly fee); (2) a bilateral 
commitment to arbitrate; and (3) a bilateral commitment to arbitrate 
challenges to contract (2).  Only if a challenge were directed at contract 
(3) could a party resisting arbitration seek refuge in court (subject to an 
important qualification).50 
That is the potential impact of Rent-A-Center.  Whether that impact 
is widely felt, of course, depends on the frequency with which parties 
employ such clauses.  So we sought to ascertain how often contracts, like 
the Rent-A-Center contract, attempt to allocate competence over 
challenges to the arbitration agreement exclusively to the arbitrator. 
To test this proposition about Rent-A-Center’s impact, we consulted 
three datasets.  The first was the franchise dataset, discussed above.51  
The second consisted of arbitration clauses collected from a 2008 sample 
of joint venture agreements (both domestic and international), 
submitted as attachments to SEC filings.52  The third was derived from a 
new database of credit card contracts made available by the Federal 
Reserve Board pursuant to the Credit Card Accountability 
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009.53  Table 2 summarizes our 
findings: 
  
 
50.  Here’s the important qualification: if the party challenging the agreement alleges 
that the parties never formed any of the agreements (for example, due to lack of assent), the 
court would resolve that jurisdictional issue.  See Granite Rock Co. v. Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 
2847, 2860 (2010). 
51.  Data on delegation clauses were not included in the published version of the study.  
We reviewed the arbitration clauses used in the study for the presence of delegation clauses. 
52.  For further description of the dataset, see Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 465–
66 & n.143.  Again, data on delegation clauses were not included in the published version of 
the study, but were, instead, obtained from a review of the arbitration clauses used in the 
study. 
53.  Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 204, 123 Stat. 1734, 1746 (2009) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 1632); 
see also 12 C.F.R. § 226.58(c)(2) (2010).  The sample we use in this article consists of all credit 
card agreements that included arbitration clauses as of December 31, 2009, which were 
submitted by issuers to the Federal Reserve and made available on the Federal Reserve web 
page as of September 1, 2010.  A total of 65 issuers — banks, thrifts, credit unions, and several 
nonfinancial businesses (retailers that offer credit to their customers) — submitted credit card 
agreements with arbitration clauses, including the largest credit card issuers that at the time 
were using arbitration clauses.  For our purposes here, we do not distinguish among the 
different types of issuers.  
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Table 2. Delegation Clauses in Arbitration Clauses, by Type of Contract 
Type of 
Contract 
Delegation 
Clause 
Anti-
Delegation 
Clause 
Class 
Exception 
No 
Delegation 
Clause 
Franchise 
Agreements 
(2007) 
4 (14.3%) 2 (7.1%) 0 (0.0%) 22 (78.6%) 
Joint Venture 
Agreements -
Domestic 
(2008) 
1 (11.1%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (88.9%) 
Joint Venture 
Agreements -
International 
(2008) 
1 (5.0%) 0 (0.0%) 0 (0.0%) 19 (95.0%) 
Credit Card 
Contracts 
(2009) 
31 (49.2%) 6 (9.5%) 20 (31.7%) 6 (9.5%) 
 
The findings in Table 2 indicate (not surprisingly) that the use of 
express delegation clauses varies with the type of contract.54  They are 
rarely used in joint venture agreements and used slightly more 
frequently in franchise agreements.55  In both instances, though, such 
clauses appear only in a handful of contracts.  By contrast, delegation 
clauses appear far more frequently (31 of 63, or 49.2%) in the credit 
card agreements with arbitration clauses gathered from the Federal 
Reserve database. 
Notably, just under ten percent of the credit card arbitration 
agreements (and just over seven percent of the franchise arbitration 
agreements) include what we call an “anti-delegation clause”—a 
provision that reserves decision on the enforceability of the arbitration 
 
54.  In addition, the delegation clauses themselves varied.  By no means did all of the 
clauses include language as clear and definitive as the language in the Rent-A-Center clause.  
Note also that the terms of the arbitration agreement were missing for two of the credit card 
contracts in the sample which otherwise indicated that disputes were subject to arbitration.  
As a result, those agreements are not included in the results reported in Table 2. 
55.  An additional six of the twenty-eight franchise arbitration clauses included language 
stating that the parties agreed to arbitrate claims that the entire franchise agreement or any 
provision thereof was invalid.  Because those provisions did not specifically refer to the 
arbitration clause, we did not classify them as delegation clauses. 
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clause to the court rather than the arbitrators.56  In addition, over thirty 
percent of the credit card arbitration agreements (but none of the 
franchise arbitration agreements) reserved decisions on the validity of 
any class-arbitration waiver for the court.57  We suspect that the 
motivation for these clauses is the desire to preserve the opportunity for 
immediate, de novo review in the event of an adverse decision 
(something that a party would not receive if the matter were delegated 
to the arbitrator).  But regardless, such provisions do provide some 
reason to believe that Rent-A-Center will not result in all businesses 
including delegation clauses in their consumer and employment 
arbitration clauses.58 
It is important to stress the limits of the data.  We do not have data 
on employment contracts—the type of contract at issue in Rent-A-
Center—and we do not claim that our results are representative of all 
types of contracts.  Moreover, the data on some of the types of contracts 
may be out-of-date.  The most recent data we examined (for credit card 
contracts, as of December 31, 2009), also have the greatest usage of 
delegation clauses, which may provide some evidence of a trend toward 
greater use of such clauses (or which may simply reflect a greater usage 
of delegation clauses in credit card agreements). 
Express clauses are not the only means by which parties might 
reallocate from courts to arbitrators the power to rule on jurisdictional 
challenges.  Another, potentially more important, means would be 
through incorporation of institutional rules (like the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association).  Such rules often contain language 
that authorizes the arbitrator to rule on jurisdictional challenges.  Rule 
7(a) of the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules is exemplary: “The 
arbitrator shall have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, 
 
56.  For example, the arbitration clause for the Merrick Bank credit cardholder 
agreement provided that “[a]ny claim, dispute or controversy (“Claim”) by either you or us 
against the other arising from or relating in any way to the Agreement or your Account, 
except for the validity, scope or enforceability of this Arbitration Agreement, shall, at the 
demand of any party, be resolved by binding arbitration.”  Merrick Bank, Merrick Bank Visa 
or MasterCard Cardholder Agreement ¶ 22 (Dec. 31, 2009) (copy on file with authors). 
57.  For example, the arbitration clause in the M&I Federal Savings Bank credit 
cardholder agreement provided that “[a] court with proper jurisdiction and not an arbitrator 
will determine whether this provision prohibiting class actions, joinder and/or consolidation is 
valid and effective.”  M&I Bank, M&I Bank FSB Pricing Information Addendum ¶ 24 (Dec. 
31, 2009) (copy on file with authors). 
58.  For different views, see Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 46 
(“[D]elegation clauses have already become fixtures in consumer and employment 
contracts.”); Stipanowich, supra note 20, at 20 (“In fact, agreements to delegate ‘gateway’ 
functions to arbitrators are ubiquitous in business contracts.”). 
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including any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity 
of the arbitration agreement.”59 
Incorporated rules like Rule 7(a) differ from the contract provision 
in Rent-A-Center in one potentially critical respect.  Unlike the contract 
in Rent-A-Center, these rules do not affirmatively exclude the 
jurisdiction of courts over the arbitrability challenge.  This raises the 
question whether an incorporated rule such as AAA Rule 7(a) supplies 
the necessary “‘clear[] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence” of the parties’ 
intent to allocate jurisdictional challenges to the arbitration.60 
Opinions differ on this point.  Federal appellate courts have 
overwhelmingly concluded that such language satisfies the First Options 
standard and, thereby, strips the court of an up-front authority to rule 
on a challenge to the arbitration clause.61  In contrast, the recent 
Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration has taken the opposite view, concluding that, to satisfy First 
Options, the contract (or institutional rule) must use language 
designating that the arbitrator’s jurisdiction over such challenges is 
exclusive.62  Under the Restatement view, the Rent-A-Center language 
suffices; institutional rules such as AAA Rule 7(a), as presently phrased, 
do not. 
We do not seek here to resolve that doctrinal quibble.  Instead, on 
the assumption that the federal appellate courts state the prevailing law 
at present, we again consulted the various contract datasets to ascertain 
how frequently parties are incorporating institutional rules into their 
arbitration agreements.  Table 3 summarizes our findings: 
 
  
 
59.  American Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation 
Procedures, Rule R-7(a) (June 1, 2009), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440.  
60.  See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting 
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).  
61.  See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208 (2d Cir. 2005); 
Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331–32 (11th Cir. 2005); FSC 
Secs. Corp. v. Freel, 14 F.3d 1310, 1312–13 (8th Cir. 1994); Apollo Computer, Inc. v. Berg, 886 
F.2d 469, 472–73 (1st Cir. 1989). 
62.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 5-10 cmt. e & reporter’s note e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010).  Professor 
Drahozal is an Associate Reporter for the Restatement.  The views stated in this article 
reflect his personal views and should not be attributed to the other Reporters or the 
American Law Institute. 
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Table 3. Arbitration Provider Specified in Arbitration Clauses,  
by Type of Contract 
Type of Contract Provider 
Credit Card (2009) 
AAA – 20 (30.8%) 
JAMS – 2 (3.1%) 
NAF63 – 7 (10.8%) 
Choice of Provider64 – 32 (49.2%) 
None or missing – 4 (6.2%) 
Franchise Agreements 
(2007)65 
AAA – 24 (85.7%) 
JAMS – 1 (3.6%) 
Choice among providers – 3 (10.7%) 
Joint Venture 
Agreements - Domestic 
(2008) 
AAA – 8 (88.9%) 
AAA/ICDR – 1 (11.1%) 
Joint Venture 
Agreements -
International (2008)66 
AAA – 2 (10.0%) 
CIETAC – 4 (20.0%) 
FETACC – 3 (15.0%) 
HKIAC – 2 (10.0%) 
IAA – 2 (10.0%) 
ICC – 1 (5.0%) 
SIAC – 1 (5.0%) 
SIAC (UNTIRAL Rules) – 1 (5.0%) 
Ad hoc (UNCITRAL Rules) – 1 (5.0%) 
Ad hoc – 3 (15.0%) 
 
63.  In July 2009, the NAF discontinued administering new consumer arbitrations, as part 
of the settlement of a consumer fraud lawsuit brought by the Minnesota Attorney General.  
Consent Judgment para. 3, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 
(Minn. Dist. Ct. July 17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree. 
pdf.  Shortly thereafter, the American Arbitration Association announced a moratorium on 
its administration of many (albeit not all) debt collection arbitrations brought by businesses 
against consumers (but not claims brought by consumers against businesses arising out of the 
same contracts).  American Arbitration Association, Notice on Consumer Debt Collection 
Arbitrations, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=36427 (last visited May 16, 2011). 
64.  Of the 32 clauses that listed a choice of providers, 29 (or 90.6%) included the 
American Arbitration Association as an option.  In addition, the other major arbitral 
institutions administering these sorts of arbitrations (JAMS and NAF) both have provisions 
in their rules similar to AAA Rule 7(a).  Thus, the effect of Rent-A-Center on the allocation 
question potentially will be quite profound. 
65.  Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 36, at 101 tbl.7.  
66.  Key to the abbreviations in Table 3:  AAA – American Arbitration Association; 
CIETAC – China International Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission; FETACC – 
Foreign Economic & Trade Arbitration Commission of China; HKIAC – Hong Kong 
International Arbitration Centre; IAA – International Arbitration Association; ICC – 
International Chamber of Commerce; SIAC – Singapore International Arbitration Center; 
SIAC (UNCITRAL) – administered by Singapore International Arbitration Centre under 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Ad hoc (UNCITRAL) – non-administered arbitration 
subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules; Ad hoc – non-administered arbitration subject 
to various national laws. 
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As shown in Table 3, the AAA is the most common provider 
specified in domestic arbitration agreements in the United States.  A 
wider array of providers (not surprisingly) is specified in international 
arbitration agreements; most, however, have a rule like Rule 7(a) of the 
AAA Commercial Rules.  Thus, to the extent that courts construe the 
language in the AAA rules consistently with the delegation clause in 
Rent-A-Center, the decision is likely to have far-reaching effects, even 
without the need for parties to revise their arbitration clauses.  To be 
clear, however, it will only have those effects in cases in which the 
parties incorporate institutional rules in their arbitration clauses and do 
not address the delegation issue specifically in their clause.  If the parties 
address the issue, either by expanding or contracting the scope of the 
arbitrators’ authority, the delegation (or anti-delegation) provision will 
govern rather than the institutional rules. 
Based on the growing use of detailed arbitration clauses, we 
anticipate two developments in the wake of Rent-A-Center.  First, we 
expect to see an increased use of detailed delegation clauses such as 
those at issue in Rent-A-Center (in order to avoid the doctrinal question 
that divides the federal courts from the Restatement), particularly in 
contracts between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties.  But we do 
not expect delegation clauses to become ubiquitous, given that some 
sophisticated parties seem to prefer to have courts rather than 
arbitrators rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement.  Second, we 
expect that opponents of arbitration will seek to develop a jurisprudence 
attacking the delegation clause (as opposed to the underlying arbitration 
clause).  After Rent-A-Center, attacks on that clause remain the only 
issue unquestionably within the court’s domain where parties have 
delegated to the arbitrator the power to rule on the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement.67 
B.  Procedural Contractual Freedom: Limits 
Rent-A-Center raises important normative questions extending far 
beyond the narrow issues involving delegation clauses.  At a broad level 
of generality, the case concerns the extent to which the law constrains 
parties’ ability to contract freely for the procedures governing their 
dispute.  Much has been written on the general limits of contractual 
 
67.  See Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 30 (“[P]laintiffs may never be 
able to prove that a delegation clause is unconscionable. . . .  [O]ther than [a handful of] 
unlikely scenarios, any claim that a delegation clause is unconscionable comes perilously close 
to being a non-sequitur.”). 
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freedom, and we do not re-plow that familiar ground.  Instead, we 
examine several possible regulatory models and defend a model that 
involves a blend of industry self-regulation and case-by-case judicial 
oversight. 
1.  Industry Self-Regulation 
Like many industries, the dispute resolution industry is theoretically 
capable of self-regulation.  In the context of procedures and contract, 
this self-regulation has taken the form of due process protocols.  The 
protocols and their history have been amply discussed elsewhere,68 so we 
summarize them here only to the extent necessary to advance our thesis. 
The protocols signify a commitment by certain arbitral institutions 
(such as the American Arbitration Association and JAMS) that they 
will only administer arbitrations in certain fields (such as employment, 
consumer, and health care) if the parties ensure that a minimum set of 
procedural “rights” are observed.  As Paul Verkuil has observed, the 
choice of terminology (“due process protocol”) is an odd one in light of 
the conclusion that arbitration does not constitute state action and, as a 
strictly doctrinal matter, is not subject to constitutional requirements of 
due process.69  Nonetheless, the protocols function in a manner not 
unlike rules of procedural due process, setting forth a series of norms 
that must be observed in a decision-making process before the results of 
that process will be legally enforceable.70  The due process protocol for 
employment disputes exemplifies the sorts of rights guaranteed to the 
employee: 
 
 the employee has the right to be represented by a person of 
her own choosing; 
 the employer is encouraged to pay at least a share of the 
employee’s fees; 
 
68.  Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process Protocol at Ten:  Twenty 
Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 
168–174 (2005); Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 390–91 (2004); Arnold M. Zack, Arbitration as a Tool to Unclog 
Government and the Judiciary:  The Due Process Protocol as an International Model, 7 
WORLD ARB. & MED. REP. 10 passim (1996); Searle Civil Justice Institute, Consumer 
Arbitration Before the American Arbitration Association 16–24 (Mar. 2009) (copy on file 
with authors) [hereinafter Searle Study]. 
69.  Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 985 (2005). 
70.  The content of some of the protections finds its roots in procedural protections 
attendant to labor-management arbitrations under collective bargaining agreements.  See 
Harding, supra note 68, at 395–96. 
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 employees should have access to all information reasonably 
relevant to their claims; 
 before selecting an arbitrator, parties should have sufficient 
information to contact parties who previously have appeared 
before her; 
 arbitrators should have sufficient skill and knowledge; 
 arbitrators should be drawn from a diverse background; 
 arbitrators should be free of any relationships that would 
create an actual or apparent conflict of interest; 
 the employee is entitled to the same array of remedies in 
arbitration as she would be entitled to in a judicial 
proceeding.71 
 
In this regard, the protocols function as a type of industry-imposed 
constraint on parties’ freedom to enter into procedural contracts. 
2.  Judicial Oversight 
Courts can also regulate the parties’ procedural contractual 
freedom.72  Doctrinally, they do this in several ways.  First, they can rely 
on Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.73  The Supreme Court has 
interpreted Section 2 to mean that courts can refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements on the basis of generally applicable contract 
defenses (like fraud, duress, and unconscionability).74  Second, with 
respect to federal statutory claims at least, they can declare that that an 
arbitral system is inadequate to permit vindication of a party’s statutory 
rights (for example, by holding that an arbitration clause with a fee-
shifting provision deters vindication of a statutory right).75  Finally, they 
 
71.  American Arbitration Association, Employment Due Process Protocol (May 9, 
1995), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28535. 
72.  See Lampley, supra note 12 passim. 
73.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
74.  See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).   
75.  This ground traces to the Court’s decision in Gilmer.  While the Court in Gilmer 
dismissed a host of broad-based procedural attacks on the arbitral process (on matters like 
arbitrator bias, insufficient discovery, the lack of a written opinion and insufficient remedial 
powers), it left the door ajar for a more targeted attack on procedures in arbitration.  In a 
statement that would set the stage for the current battles over contract and procedure, the 
Court, quoting its prior decision in Mitsubishi, opined that “so long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the 
statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”  Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).  Logically, this statement implied 
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can rely on various doctrines allowing them to vacate (or refuse to 
enforce) arbitral awards on the basis of some procedural defect in the 
arbitration (for example, by refusing to enforce an arbitral award when 
the arbitrators acted with “evident partiality”).76 
3.  Statutory Regulation 
Legislatures can regulate parties’ procedural contracts.77  Such 
regulation might take various forms.  One form would be to declare 
certain disputes non-arbitrable, as Congress previously has done in 
certain specialized industries such as automobile dealer agreements, 
consumer financial services contracts with military personnel, poultry 
wholesale contracts (providing a statutory opt-out from arbitration 
clauses), employment agreements of defense contractors and most 
recently, residential mortgages and whistleblower claims in the 
commodities industry.78  The previously mentioned Arbitration Fairness 
Act would broadly adopt this approach by making pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements unenforceable in consumer and employment 
agreements.79  Though not aimed directly at procedural contracts, such 
legislative action has the indirect effect of constraining parties’ 
procedural contractual freedom by restoring elements of the second era 
of contract and procedure.80  Another form would be to condition the 
enforcement of arbitral awards on adherence to certain procedures.  
Section 10 of the FAA does this to a degree by providing that an arbitral 
 
that when an arbitral forum deprived a litigant of her ability effectively to vindicate her 
statutory causes of action, that defect could render the arbitration clause unenforceable.  For 
a thoughtful argument that the Court should reorient these categories, see Hiro N. Aragaki, 
Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1716439. 
76.  See 9 U.S.C. § 10. 
77.  For a spirited defense of this approach, see Miller, supra note 7, at 404–09.  See also 
Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, supra note 7, at 43–46 (defending congressional control 
over the enforceability of forum selection clauses); Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, 
at 665–66 & n.364 (defending a legislative ban on unilateral amendments to arbitration 
agreements). 
78.  See supra notes 4 & 5. 
79.  See supra note 24. 
80.  See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 399–400 (2009) (noting the tension between the 
Arbitration Fairness Act and freedom of contract principles); Alicia J. Surdyk, Note, On the 
Continued Vitality of Securities Arbitration:  Why Reform Efforts Must Not Preclude 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1131, 1143 (2009/10) (“[A]t the most 
fundamental level, the issue is that the cited provisions of the Arbitration Fairness Act are 
diametrically opposed to the basic principles underlying the nature of a contractual 
agreement, namely freedom of contract and certainty of contract.”). 
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award can be vacated for procedural misconduct by the arbitrator that 
prejudices a party’s rights, as noted above.81  Finally, a legislature might 
provide that an arbitration agreement will not be enforceable unless the 
agreement ensures that certain procedures are observed in the 
arbitration.  So far, Congress has not moved in this direction, although it 
has considered bills such as the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 that would 
have had such an effect.82 
4.  Administrative Regulation 
As an alternative to direct statutory language, legislatures can vest 
administrative agencies with the authority to oversee arbitration 
agreements and the procedural choices contained therein.  In the 
securities industry, this already occurs to a degree: the Securities and 
Exchange Commission oversees the development of rules governing 
disputes in certain investor and employment agreements.83  Portions of 
the recently enacted financial reform law embrace this model.  That 
legislation expands the SEC’s authority over arbitration agreements and 
authorizes it to adopt rules banning or regulating the use of arbitration 
clauses in investment advisory contracts.84  It also vests the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the authority to promulgate 
rules regulating the content of arbitration agreements in certain 
consumer finance contracts (like credit card agreements) and, if 
appropriate, to prohibit those agreements entirely.85 
  
 
81.  9 U.S.C. § 10(c). 
82.  See Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).  Along similar lines, 
the American Arbitration Association has proposed codification of the Due Process 
Protocols.  See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the  Subcomm. 
on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 11–12 (2007) (statement of 
Richard Naimark, Senior Vice President, American Arbitration Association), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_senate_hearings&docid=f:42 
605.pdf. 
83.  See Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty:  The Regulation of Fairness in Securities 
Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 495 (2008); Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to 
Securities ADR, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 420–24 (2006). 
84.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 921(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o). 
85.  Id. § 1028, 124 Stat. 2003–04. 
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5.  What’s the Optimal Approach? 
In our view, a blend of industry self-regulation and judicial oversight 
likely is optimal, at least based on a cost-benefit calculation.  Here’s 
why: 
First, private regulation can reduce transaction costs.  A familiar 
literature in political science has documented the difficulties of enacting 
legislation due to the multiple decision points where legislative action 
may fail (committee, floor vote, conference committee, veto).86  The 
protocols avoid these impediments to action by involving a single 
decision point, namely voluntary assent by the associations themselves.  
Due to the reduced number of decision points, they are also more easily 
changed and adapted to evolving circumstances.87  Administrative 
regulation avoids some of these barriers but, of course, presupposes a 
degree of legislative authorization which may be difficult to obtain. 
Second, private regulation can offer greater comprehensiveness.  In 
contrast to judicial regulation, private regulation and certain forms of 
public regulation (both legislative and administrative) can be more 
comprehensive and more nuanced.  Drafters of the protocols can 
consider the gamut of available data and experience.  By contrast, 
judicial regulators may be constrained by the record evidence offered by 
the parties. 
Third, private regulation is more easily tailored to differing 
circumstances.  Compared to all three forms of public regulation 
(judicial, legislative, and administrative), the protocol mechanism allows 
its drafters to tailor the protocols to the particular needs of the regulated 
industry, as exemplified by the substantive differences between the 
protocols for employment, consumer, and health care arbitrations.  By 
contrast, the scope of any judicial regulation may be constrained by 
doctrines such as standing, bars against advisory opinions, and limits on 
the remedial powers of courts.  And legislation that treats all consumer 
and employment contracts identically (such as by making pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements in those contracts unenforceable) fails to 
consider that not all arbitration is alike.88 
 
86.  See generally R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
(1990); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 
2003). 
87.  See Harding, supra note 68, at 369–73. 
88.  See Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA 
Consumer Arbitrations, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 918 (2010) (“These variations 
suggest the need for a nuanced approach to public policy concerning arbitration.”). 
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Judicial oversight facilitates this process of adaptation.  A rich 
scholarship has focused the various “feedback loops” between private 
and public actors in the development of legal norms.89  The protocols 
provide courts a workable benchmark by which to evaluate the fairness 
of other procedures; moreover, hammered out through dialogue 
between the industry and advocates for employees and consumers, they 
arguably offer a relatively balanced metric rather than a biased one.  
Forged through this process, the protocols stimulate a dialogue between 
courts and the arbitration industry.  For example, in Cole v. Burns 
International Security Services, Chief Judge Edwards expressed his 
disagreement with the employment protocol’s cost-sharing provisions, 
which sparked a lively debate over whether the protocol or some other 
approach should be used to ensure the affordability of arbitration for 
employees with statutory claims.90  Just as the protocols can influence 
judicial understanding of fair arbitral procedures, judicial critique can 
suggest reform pathways to the protocols’ developers.91 
Fourth, private regulation enhances opportunities for participation 
by interested groups (or policy entrepreneurs acting on their behalf).  
As Margaret Harding has observed, the protocol process holds forth the 
potential for greater participation by interested groups.92  Whereas 
access limitations or standing doctrines may limit groups’ ability to 
influence the outcome of legislative or judicial regulation, the process of 
 
89.  See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient?  Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and 
the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24–30 (2005).  See generally Eric 
A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on 
Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996) (discussing “insulation theory” of nonlegal 
sanctions). 
90.  105 F.3d 1465, 1483–1485 (D.C. Cir. 1997).  For exemplary literature on the cost-
sharing debate, see, for example, Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an 
Unlawful Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution?  The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory 
Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002); R. Brian Tipton, Allocating the Costs 
of Arbitrating Statutory Claims Under the Federal Arbitration Act: An Unresolved Issue, 26 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 325 (2002).  The July 2002 issue of the University of Miami Law 
Review dedicated an entire symposium to the issue of arbitration cost allocation in the wake 
of Green Tree Financial. 
91.  This consideration favors industry promulgation of the protocols instead of 
codification of the Due Process Protocols, as some have proposed.  See supra note 82.  While 
codification of the protocols could accomplish several of the same ends (and avoid any 
ambiguity over their legal status, see infra note 107), ultimately we fear that a legislative 
solution would be too blunt and inflexible an instrument.  Given the difficulties in enacting 
legislation, it would be more difficult to amend or modify the codified protocols than it would 
be to adjust them through the private revisions, something that arbitral institutions do 
regularly with their own rules. 
92.  Harding, supra note 68, at 371. 
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protocol development and acceptance suffers from no such inherent 
limitations.  To be sure, the validity of this premise depends on the 
extent to which the protocols’ developers choose to include various 
groups in the development process. 
While we have offered a variety of reasons that support a regulatory 
approach based on private regulation combined with judicial oversight, 
we acknowledge several potential criticisms of that approach and 
address the most significant ones here. 
First, our proposed approach might prompt a “race to the bottom.”93  
In other words, competition among providers might prompt them to 
skew their procedural standards in order to cater to the needs of the 
dominant business interest much like certain states have diluted their 
standards on matters like corporate law or usury law in order to attract 
corporate investment.94  Indeed, some arbitral institutions have been 
severely criticized for doing precisely this.95 
However, we believe this criticism overlooks a powerful counter-
incentive—namely the bond of the arbitrator and the arbitral 
institution.96  Recall that arbitral awards ultimately are subject to judicial 
oversight in vacatur and enforcement proceedings.97  This judicial 
scrutiny provides a compelling counterweight to any incentive that 
otherwise might incline the arbitrator to favor the repeat player or the 
party in the superior bargaining position.98  An arbitrator (or institution) 
whose awards are routinely set aside will not be in the business for long 
because neither party has an incentive to invest in a decision maker 
 
93.  See Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, at 637–38. 
94.  See ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 33, 109–13 (2009).  
Whether there is in fact a “race to the bottom” in corporate law is hotly debated.  Id. at 245 
n.1. 
95.  See, e.g., JOHN O’DONNELL ET. AL., PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP: 
HOW CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 1–13 (2007) (addressing the 
National Arbitration Forum). 
96.  See Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1235–37 (2003). 
97.  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 
U.N.T.S. 38.  In addition, the arbitration agreements themselves are subject to court oversight 
prior to the proceeding. 
98.  Empirical evidence supports this postulate.  The available empirical evidence on the 
“repeat player” effect is mixed at best.  To the extent such an effect has been documented, 
the prevailing view is that repeat players do better in arbitration not because the arbitrators 
systematically favor them but, instead, because the repeat players’ experience enables them 
to decide which cases to settle (where their adversary’s position is strong) and which to 
contest (where their adversary’s position is weak).  See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at 
908–16; Rutledge, supra note 26, at 565–67. 
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whose decisions are likely to be invalidated.  Thus, while we recognize 
the intuitive appeal of the race-to-the-bottom argument, we are 
disinclined to believe it has much bite in this context.99 
Second, private regulation might reduce transparency.100  Compared 
to more regulatory forms of rule development, the protocols are not 
developed according to any standardized methods by which they are 
closely scrutinized.101  In Gillian Metzger’s terms, the protocols lack 
adequate “accountability mechanisms.”102  By contrast, for example, 
administrative regulation typically would undergo a formal notice-and-
comment period followed often by judicial challenge to the 
reasonableness of the agency’s regulation.  Likewise, a process of 
legislative regulation likely would create some sort of legislative record 
that a court could scrutinize.  This criticism is, in our view, overblown.  
The history of the protocols’ development, thoroughly recounted by 
scholars such as Margaret Harding and Richard Bales, demonstrates 
that interested groups consistently had a seat at the table as the 
protocols were developed.103  Metzger’s complaint about the lack of 
“accountability mechanisms” proves too much—for it would necessitate 
public oversight of any project of private norm development—
something that would be both costly and unworkable. 
Third, our proposed approach risks second-best outcomes.  As 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has explained, private regulation may not 
achieve as much substantively as direct regulation.104  This stems from 
the bargaining toward second-best solutions.  For example, as Menkel-
 
99.  In this regard, we part company with Carrington and Haagen, who contend that 
arbitrators “are dependent for their careers, to a degree that no judges are, on the 
acceptability of their awards to the parties, and perhaps especially on their acceptability to 
parties who are ‘repeat players.’”  Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 346.  This account 
overlooks the arbitrator’s more compelling incentive to develop and maintain a reputational 
bond for rendering enforceable awards, irrespective of the identity of the prevailing party. 
100.  On the relationship between arbitration and democratic theory, see generally 
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004) (asking whether arbitration furthers the goals of democratic 
governance). 
101.  On the defects in the decision-making process behind the protocols’ development, 
see Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes: A Public Policy 
Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173, 215–
22 (1998).  
102.  Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1456–76 
(2003). 
103.  See Bales, supra note 68, at 171–72; Harding, supra note 68, at 390–91. 
104.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute 
Resolution Processes:  What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 949–951 
(2002). 
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Meadow describes, advocates for the employment protocol necessarily 
compromised on certain procedural protections in order to obtain the 
assent of the various industry participants and arbitral institutions.  As a 
consequence of this second-best quality to the protocol-development 
process, critics have called for strengthened protections.105  This criticism 
is both too static and too platonic.  It is static because it ignores the fact 
that the protocols are capable of refinement.  Merely because the 
protocols might have resulted from some sort of compromise at a given 
point in time does not preclude their refinement at some future point if 
empirical evidence is put forth that undercuts the premise of a 
compromise.  It is too platonic because it presupposes that, at a given 
point in time, the drafters of the protocols had the necessary 
information to deduce the “right” answer to a given question of arbitral 
procedure and that other regulators would necessarily do better.  As we 
have explained elsewhere, the empirical record on many questions of 
arbitration is woefully incomplete;106 in light of that incomplete record, it 
is simply not realistic to argue that the compromises embedded in the 
protocols somehow shifted away from demonstrably correct approaches.  
And the same limitation applies with perhaps greater force to public, as 
opposed to private, regulatory mechanisms. 
Finally, our approach might entail a lack of predictability.  
Specifically, parties are unable to predict precisely how courts will use 
the protocols.  Some decisions, as noted above, cite the protocols as 
merely indicative of a professional trend; by contrast, others come close 
to saying that the failure of an arbitration proceeding to comport with 
the protocols provides a legal reason for denying enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement altogether.  As Richard Bales has explained, the 
due process protocols function as guideposts for both employers and the 
judiciary but no longer provide predictable guidance.107 
This criticism is a fair one, at least in part.  But it overlooks that the 
protocols are enforced in the first instance by the institutions 
themselves, which refuse to administer arbitrations under clauses that 
fail to comply with the protocols.108  Court review is only a second-line 
 
105.  See, e.g., Bales, supra note 68, at 167; Harding, supra note 68, at 370–72, 417. 
106.  See Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at 845; Rutledge, supra note 26, at 576. 
107.  Bales, supra note 68, at 167; see also Martin H. Malin, Ethical Concerns in Drafting 
Employment Arbitration Agreements After Circuit City and Green Tree, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 
779, 787–88 (2003). 
108.  The Searle Study found that “the AAA effectively reviews arbitration clauses for 
protocol compliance and appropriately responds to clauses that do not comply.”  See Searle 
Study, supra note 68, at 83–100, 111. 
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defense.  As for the predictability of that court review, the best answer 
that we can offer (which is not a complete one) is that case-by-case 
judicial review will help give concrete legal content to the protocols over 
time.  As courts vacate awards due to some deviation from the protocols 
(or where the protocols themselves contain a defect), such action may 
well prompt a revision to the protocols.  At the same time, as courts 
confirm awards rendered in accordance with protocol-based procedures, 
the protocols will develop a type of quasi-legal status that enables them 
to serve as a benchmark for enforceability of an award. 
This Part has examined the exercise of and limits on procedural 
contractual freedom.  Using the delegation clause from Rent-A-Center 
as a point of reference, it demonstrated that the use of such clauses 
varies widely across types of contracts.  It showed further that, when 
such clauses are absent, the incorporation of institutional rules (such as 
AAA Rule 7(a)) can achieve the same effect indirectly (at least so long 
as the view of the federal appellate courts prevails over that of the 
Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration).  As to the normative issues underpinning Rent-A-Center, 
from a cost-benefit perspective, a blend of industry self-regulation and 
case-by-case judicial oversight offers the best means of policing 
procedural contractual freedom—such an approach reduces transaction 
costs, is flexible, is comprehensive, and affords ample opportunities for 
participation.  While the approach is not immune from criticism, most 
notably fears about unpredictability, those criticisms ultimately can be 
answered.  In the next Part, we turn to a related set of issues—namely 
cases in which the parties’ procedural contracts are silent. 
IV.  WHEN THE PROCEDURAL CONTRACT IS SILENT— 
FILLING GAPS AFTER STOLT-NIELSEN 
Arbitration agreements, like other contracts, can be incomplete.  
Complete contracting is costly, even when the contracts are standard 
form contracts drafted by only one party.109  Although rules promulgated 
by arbitration providers offer a low-cost way to supplement contract 
provisions drafted by the parties, even those rules are not complete. 
An important function of arbitration statutes—both the Federal 
 
109.  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92–93 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling 
Gaps].  See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the 
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, 
Strategic Contractual Inefficiency]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the 
Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
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Arbitration Act and state arbitration laws—is to fill gaps in arbitration 
agreements.  But the FAA has few clearly identifiable default rules,110 
largely a consequence of its 1925 vintage.  And state arbitration laws 
raise difficult and unsettled issues of FAA preemption, which may limit 
their usefulness as gap-fillers, and are themselves incomplete.111 
As a general matter, arbitrators have substantial discretion in filling 
procedural gaps in the arbitration agreement.112  But the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
International Corp.113 raises questions about the extent of arbitrator 
authority to fill gaps.  Stolt-Nielsen involved class arbitration, a setting in 
which arbitrators have often faced the necessity of gap-filling.  As such, 
this Part focuses on class arbitration as well.  The role of arbitrators in 
filling procedural gaps, however, is not limited to class arbitration.  
Other areas in which the question has arisen include consolidation of 
proceedings, joinder of parties, dispositive motions,114 and issues of 
confidentiality, among others. 
This part first provides background by tracing the development of 
 
110.  See Hall Street Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 587–88 (2008). 
111.  Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 
416–20 (2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for 
FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1241, 1245 n.16 (2003) [hereinafter Park, FAA 
Reform]. 
112.  For example, one commentator has noted: 
 
Arbitrators can conduct proceedings in almost any manner they deem 
best, as long as they respect the arbitral mission and accord the type of 
fundamental fairness usually called ‘due process’ in the United States and 
‘natural justice’ in Britain, which includes both freedom from bias and 
allowing each side an equal right to be heard. 
William W. Park, The 2002 Freshfields Lecture—Arbitration’s Protean Nature: The Value of 
Rules and the Risks of Discretion, 19 ARB. INT’L 279, 281 (2003) [hereinafter Park, 
Arbitration’s Protean Nature]; see also William W. Park, Procedural Default Rules Revisited, 
in ARBITRATION INSIGHTS—TWENTY YEARS OF THE ANNUAL LECTURE OF THE SCHOOL 
OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, SPONSORED BY FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER 
360 (Julian D.M. Lew & Loukas A. Mistelis eds., 2007) [hereinafter Park, Procedural Default 
Rules Revisited].  
113.  130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
114.  D. Brian King & Jeffrey P. Commission, Summary Judgment in International 
Arbitration: The “Nay” Case 4 (2010) (Paper Presented at ABA International Law Spring 
2010 Meeting – Common Law Summary Judgment in International Arbitration), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/spring2010/materials/Common%20Law%20Summary%20
Judgment%20in%20International%20Arbitration/King%20-%20Commission.pdf (“[T]he 
major institutional commercial arbitration rules lack an express grant of power to tribunals 
summarily to dispose of cases.  In the light of this, arbitrators have, for the most part, been 
reluctant to rely on implicit, gap-filling or inherent powers to introduce such a procedure.”). 
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the law and practice of class arbitration.  It then analyzes the possible 
doctrinal implications of Stolt-Nielsen for arbitrator procedural gap-
filling.  It next examines the positive question of interest to us—how 
arbitrators fill procedural gaps in arbitration agreements.  Finally, this 
part considers the normative question of the optimal institutional 
framework for procedural gap-filling in arbitration. 
A.  Background on Class Arbitration 
1.  From Bazzle . . . 
Although class arbitration has been around for over 25 years,115 its 
use did not become widespread until after the Supreme Court’s 2003 
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.116  In Bazzle, the Court 
granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration 
Act . . . prohibits class-action procedures from being superimposed onto 
an arbitration agreement that does not provide for class-action 
arbitration.”117  The South Carolina Supreme Court had held as a matter 
of South Carolina law that a court could order class arbitration when the 
arbitration agreement was silent as to class arbitration, and that such a 
rule was not preempted by the FAA. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed and vacated the South 
Carolina court’s ruling, but with no majority opinion for the Court.  The 
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, concluded that the lower 
court’s decision should be vacated, explaining as follows: 
 
We are faced at the outset with a problem concerning the 
contracts’ silence.  Are the contracts in fact silent, or do 
they forbid class arbitration as petitioner Green Tree 
Financial Corp. contends?  Given the South Carolina 
Supreme Court’s holding, it is important to resolve that 
question.  But we cannot do so . . . because it is a matter 
for the arbitrator to decide.118 
 
Stated otherwise, the South Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was 
based on its view that the arbitration agreement was silent as to class 
 
115.  See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, 
Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 40–42 & n.149 (2000). 
116.  539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
117.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S 444 
(2003) (No. 02-634). 
118.  Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447. 
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arbitration—that there was in fact a gap that it could fill using a state-
law gap-filler.  If the arbitration agreement precluded class arbitration, 
there was no basis for the South Carolina court to use a gap-filler 
(because there was no gap), and its ruling would have been improper.  
But the issue of whether there was a gap in the arbitration agreement, 
according to the plurality, was an issue the arbitrator had to decide.119 
Justice Stevens did not agree with the plurality’s rationale (he wrote 
that “arguably” the arbitrator should have decided the issue, but 
because the lower court’s decision was “correct as a matter of law,” he 
would simply have affirmed that decision).120  But he concurred in the 
judgment vacating the award to provide a controlling judgment of the 
Court.121  Three Justices would have reversed the South Carolina court 
judgment on the ground that the FAA does not permit a court to order 
class arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent on the issue.122  
Justice Thomas likewise dissented, but on the ground that the FAA 
does not apply in state court and so there was no reason to vacate the 
judgment below.123 
After the splintered decision in Bazzle, several arbitration 
providers—most prominently the American Arbitration Association—
set up processes for administering class arbitrations based on the 
plurality’s decision.124  The AAA’s Supplementary Rules for Class 
Arbitrations set out a multi-step procedure for a class arbitration to 
follow.125  First, the arbitrators are to “determine . . . whether the 
applicable arbitration clause permits the arbitration to proceed on 
behalf of or against a class” and to issue a clause construction award 
reflecting their decision.126  Second, if the arbitrators conclude that the 
arbitration clause permits class arbitration, they next decide whether 
class arbitration is appropriate in the case, using standards heavily 
 
119.  Although the case also involved a related arbitration proceeding—i.e., a proceeding 
in which the arbitrator already had construed the arbitration agreement—the Court held that 
the arbitrator’s determination could have been influenced by the South Carolina court’s 
decision and so vacated the award as well.  Id. at 453–54. 
120.  Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. at 459–60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
123.  Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
124.  For example, JAMS also began administering class arbitrations following Bazzle.  
See JAMS, JAMS Class Action Procedures, May 1, 2009, http://www.jamsadr.com/files/ 
Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures-2009.pdf. 
125.  American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations, 
Oct. 8, 2003, available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936. 
126.  Id. Rule 3. 
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influenced by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and issue a class 
determination award.127  Third, if the arbitrators decide that class 
arbitration is appropriate, they proceed to adjudicate the case on the 
merits.128  In between each step, the AAA’s rules provide for a short, 
mandatory stay to permit the losing party to seek court review of the 
award.  The AAA subsequently issued a policy statement in which it 
stated that it would administer arbitrations on a class basis only if the 
arbitration agreement specified any set of AAA rules and was “silent 
with respect to class claims, consolidation, or joinder of claims.”129  If the 
arbitration agreement by its terms precluded class arbitration, the AAA 
would not administer the case unless a court ordered arbitration on a 
class basis. 
In an amicus brief filed in the Stolt-Nielsen case on September 4, 
2009,130 the AAA provided a useful overview of its class arbitration 
caseload.  Overall, the AAA indicated that it had administered 283 class 
arbitrations since promulgating its class arbitration rules.131  Of the 283 
cases, 106 (37%) involved consumer claimants and 96 (34%) involved 
employee claimants, while 81 (28%) were business-versus-business class 
arbitrations.132  Arbitrators had issued 135 clause construction awards: 95 
(70%) holding that the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration; 7 
(5%) holding that the arbitration clause did not permit class arbitration; 
and 33 (24%) in which the parties stipulated that the arbitration clause 
permitted class arbitration.133  A total of 121 cases (42.8%) were still 
active at the time the brief was filed.134 
  
 
127.  Id. Rules 4–5. 
128.  Id. Rule 7. 
129.  American Arbitration Association, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, July 14, 
2005, http://www.adr.org/Classarbitrationpolicy. 
130.  See infra text accompanying notes 131–134. 
131.  Brief of American Arbitration Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party at 22, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 08-
1198).  
132.  Id. at 23–24.  The AAA provided a breakdown of the types of business-versus-
business class arbitrations:  21 (7%) franchises; 20 (7%) healthcare; 9 (3%) financial services; 
and 31 (11%) other.  Id. at 23. 
133.  Id. at 22.  The AAA reported further that arbitrators issued class determination 
awards in 48 cases:  in 24 (50%), the award certified the class; in 18 (38%) the award denied 
class certification; and in 6 (13%) the parties stipulated to certifying a class.  Id.  At the time 
the brief was filed, none of the class arbitrations had been resolved on the merits.  Id. at 23. 
134.  Id. at 22. 
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2.  . . . to Stolt-Nielsen 
The Supreme Court revisited class arbitration in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds International, Corp.135 in a very different setting from 
Bazzle.  The claimants in Stolt-Nielsen were all commercial parties, 
rather than consumers (as in Bazzle) or employees.  As noted above, 
although most class arbitrations involve consumer or employee 
claimants, a sizable percentage involve business claimants.136  Moreover, 
in Stolt-Nielsen the parties entered into two separate arbitration 
agreements.  One was an arbitration clause in the original contract 
between the parties; the other was a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate 
the issue of whether class arbitration was permissible under the original 
arbitration agreement.  In entering into the post-dispute agreement, the 
parties agreed to follow the AAA class arbitration rules (although not 
to have the case administered by the AAA), and stipulated that the 
arbitration clause was “silent” as to class arbitration.137  In other words, 
another way that Stolt-Nielsen differed from Bazzle is that in Stolt-
Nielsen the parties agreed that the arbitration agreement had a gap. 
Relying on other arbitration awards, which had construed “a wide 
variety of clauses in a wide variety of settings as allowing for class 
arbitration,” although none “exactly comparable” to the case, the 
arbitrators concluded that the evidence did not show “that the 
parties . . . intended to preclude class arbitration.”138  The district court 
vacated the award, holding that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded 
the law by failing to analyze the applicable law.  The court of appeals 
reversed, concluding that the arbitrators had not manifestly disregarded 
the law because nothing in New York law or maritime law precluded 
class arbitration. 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, reasoning as 
follows.  First, the Court held that the arbitrators’ clause construction 
award should be vacated because the arbitrators had exceeded their 
 
135.  130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010). 
136.  See supra text accompanying note 132. 
137.  130 S. Ct. at 1765–66. 
138.  AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. v. Stolt-Nielsen, SA, Partial Final Clause Construction 
Award at 5, 7 (Dec. 20, 2005) (ad hoc arbitration award), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari at app. D, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) 
(No. 08-1198).  The award described the “test” as follows:  “arbitrators must look to the 
language of the parties’ agreement to ascertain the parties’ intention whether they intended 
to permit or to preclude class arbitration.”  Id. at 4.  As described below, the Supreme Court 
ultimately characterized the arbitrators’ award as based solely on the arbitrators’ own 
conception of public policy.  See infra text accompanying notes 139–144. 
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authority in relying on public policy to determine that class arbitration 
was appropriate in the case.139  The Court explained: 
 
 
Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, 
or New York law contains a “default rule” under which 
an arbitration clause is construed as allowing class 
arbitration in the absence of express consent, the panel 
proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law 
court to develop what it viewed as the best rule to be 
applied in such a situation. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  [I]nstead of identifying and applying a rule of 
decision derived from the FAA or either maritime or 
New York law, the arbitration panel imposed its own 
policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.140 
 
Second, the Court stated that because the award had been vacated, 
“under § 10(b) of the FAA, we must either ‘direct a rehearing by the 
arbitrators’ or decide the question that was originally referred to the 
panel.  Because we conclude that there can be only one possible 
outcome on the facts before us, we see no need to direct a rehearing by 
the arbitrators.”141  Accordingly, the Court proceeded to decide itself 
whether the arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. 
Third, because of the consensual nature of arbitration, the Court 
stated that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to 
class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that 
the party agreed to do so.”142  Here, the Court concluded, the parties had 
not agreed to arbitrate on a class basis, relying almost exclusively on the 
parties’ stipulation that the contract was silent on class arbitration.  
According to the Court, “class-action arbitration changes the nature of 
arbitration to such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties 
consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an 
 
139.  The Court also held that the award should be vacated as in manifest disregard of 
the law, although refusing to decide whether that ground actually was available to vacate an 
award.  130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.  In other words, the Court simply assumed away a possible 
argument that AnimalFeeds had in defense of the award (that manifest disregard of the law is 
not available as a vacatur ground under the FAA), and then proceeded to rely on that very 
ground (although only in the alternative) as a basis for vacating the award. 
140.  130 S. Ct. at 1768–70. 
141.  Id. at 1770. 
142.  Id. at 1775. 
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arbitrator.”143  Because the parties had “stipulated that there was ‘no 
agreement’” to authorize class arbitration, “it follows that the parties 
cannot be compelled to submit their dispute to class arbitration.”144 
B.  Stolt-Nielsen and Arbitrator Procedural Gap-Filling 
Each of these three aspects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-
Nielsen—(1) vacating the award for excess of authority; (2) resolving the 
class arbitration issue itself; and (3) concluding that the parties had not 
agreed to class arbitration—has potentially important implications for 
the authority of arbitrators to fill procedural gaps in arbitration 
agreements.145  This section considers the doctrinal implications of each 
 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at 1776.  On its facts, Stolt-Nielsen presented at least two other issues that the 
Court did not expressly decide.  First, the circuits currently are split on whether courts should 
vacate “non-domestic” awards—awards made in the United States but with an international 
nexus—using FAA Section 10 or using the grounds set out in Article V of the New York 
Convention.  Compare Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons, W.L.L. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 
F.3d 15, 23–25 (2d Cir. 1997) (basing decision on Section 10 grounds), with Indus. Risk 
Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshütte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441–46 (11th Cir. 1998) 
(basing decision on Article V grounds).  Stolt-Nielsen came from the Second Circuit, so not 
surprisingly the Court of Appeals, consistent with circuit precedent, reviewed the award 
under Section 10.  See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1766 
(2010).  The Supreme Court did not address the issue, but likewise used the Section 10 
vacatur grounds.  Id. at 1767–68.  Second, U.S. courts have not definitively resolved whether 
partial awards (awards that resolve finally some but not all issues in the arbitration, like the 
clause construction award in Stolt-Nielsen) are subject to vacatur under the FAA.  Cf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION § 1-1 reporter’s note a (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2010).  The Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the argument that the partial award was not ripe for review under 
constitutional standards.  130 S. Ct. at 1767 n.2.  But it refused to address prudential ripeness, 
finding it not timely raised.  Id. 
145.  One note as a matter of terminology:  The Court in Stolt-Nielsen seems to reject the 
idea that the case involves procedure at all.  It explains: 
 
The dissent minimizes these crucial differences by characterizing the 
question before the arbitrators as being merely what “procedural mode” 
was available to present AnimalFeeds’ claims.  If the question were that 
simple, there would be no need to consider the parties’ intent with respect 
to class arbitration.  But the FAA requires more.  Contrary to the dissent, 
but consistent with our precedents emphasizing the consensual basis of 
arbitration, we see the question as being whether the parties agreed to 
authorize class arbitration. 
Id. at 1776 (citations omitted).  The Court might be read as saying that the case does not 
involve arbitral procedure, but rather the jurisdiction of the arbitrators (an arbitrability issue, 
in the Court’s usual, confusing, parlance).  The problem with that view, as the Court itself 
acknowledged, is that the parties in Stolt-Nielsen had expressly agreed in a post-dispute 
arbitration agreement to arbitrate the issue of whether the original arbitration agreement 
permitted class arbitration.  Id. at 1772 (“But we need not revisit that question here because 
10. DRAHOZAL_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/2011  9:23 PM 
2011] CONTRACT AND PROCEDURE 1145 
of those aspects of the opinion in turn.146 
1.  Arbitrator Authority to Fill Procedural Gaps 
So what does Stolt-Nielsen decide about arbitrator authority to fill 
procedural gaps in the arbitration agreement in the first instance?  If the 
opinion is viewed narrowly, the Court actually may decide very little.  
Given the Court’s emphasis on ensuring that parties not be required to 
arbitrate if they have not agreed to do so, the Stolt-Nielsen opinion 
might be limited to class arbitration and comparable, essentially 
jurisdictional, issues. 
But the Court’s language is much broader.  It states: 
 
 “It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and 
application of the agreement and effectively ‘dispense[s] his 
own brand of industrial justice’ that his decision may be 
unenforceable.”147 
 “In that situation, an arbitration decision may be vacated 
under § 10(a)(4) of the FAA on the ground that the arbitrator 
‘exceeded [his] powers,’ for the task of an arbitrator is to 
interpret and enforce a contract, not to make public policy.”148 
 “Rather than inquiring whether the FAA, maritime law, or 
New York law contains a ‘default rule’ under which an 
arbitration clause is construed as allowing class arbitration in 
the absence of express consent, the panel proceeded as if it had 
the authority of a common-law court to develop what it viewed 
as the best rule to be applied in such a situation.”149 
 
the parties’ supplemental agreement expressly assigned this issue to the arbitration panel, and 
no party argues that this assignment was impermissible.”).  As a result, the Court could not 
treat the arbitrators’ decision as one involving the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, because the parties 
had clearly given the arbitrators jurisdiction to decide the issue.   
 Instead, the Court’s discussion of the “procedural mode” of the arbitration (or the lack 
thereof) in Stolt-Nielsen was in the part of the opinion dealing with the proper default rule.  
Id. at 1775.  In essence, the Court was holding that the default rule in Stolt-Nielsen was no 
class arbitration, and rejecting an alternative default that the issue was within the arbitrators’ 
usual discretion over procedural issues. 
146.  For other analyses of Stolt-Nielsen, see generally William G. Whitehill, Class 
Actions and Arbitration Murky Waters: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International 
Corp., 4 WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 1 (2010); Stipanowich, supra note 20, at 5–15. 
147.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 
504, 509 (2001) (per curiam)). 
148.  Id. 
149.  Id. at 1768–69. 
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What the Court means by “the best rule to be applied in such a 
situation” is not clear, but it sure sounds like how one would describe a 
default rule developed by a common-law court.  On this reading, the 
Court in Stolt-Nielsen concludes that arbitrators can look to statutory or 
court-developed rules to fill gaps in contracts, but cannot formulate gap-
fillers in the same way as a common law court can—and, indeed, an 
arbitral award will be vacated if the arbitrators do so. 
Such a view of arbitrator authority seems out of line with the models 
of arbitrator authority previously relied on by the Court.  In the non-
arbitrability era of U.S. arbitration law (and before),150 courts viewed 
arbitration as a process in which the arbitrator could essentially do what 
he or she thought was fair between the parties.  Carrington and Haagen 
described this model of arbitration as follows: 
 
A Latin phrase sometimes employed to describe the 
spirit of much American commercial arbitration is ex 
aequo et bono—a resolution is sought that is equitable, 
minimizes harm to either party, and enables potential 
adversaries to maintain a valuable commercial 
relationship; the role of such an arbitrator is said in 
Europe to be that of an amiable compositeur.  It is said of 
the American commercial arbitrator that he “may do 
justice as he sees it, applying his own sense of the law and 
equity to the facts as he finds them to be and making an 
award reflecting the spirit rather than the letter of the 
agreement.”151 
 
Some commentators (including Carrington and Haagen) rely on this 
“amiable compositeur” model of arbitration to criticize the use of 
arbitration to resolve statutory claims, describing arbitration as “a 
method of dispute resolution, but not necessarily a method of enforcing 
legal rights.”152 
With the demise of the non-arbitrability doctrine (or, rather, as part 
of that demise), the Supreme Court moved to what might be called a 
“legal” model of the arbitration process.  Under this model, arbitration 
is an appropriate setting for the resolution of statutory claims because 
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego the 
 
150.  See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
151.  Carrington & Haagen, supra note 1, at 345. 
152.  Id. at 344. 
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substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”153  The Court 
presumes that outcomes in arbitration and litigation will not necessarily 
differ, and refuses to question whether the resolution of statutory claims 
by arbitrators inherently differs from the resolution of such claims by 
judges. 
The Court in Stolt-Nielsen appears to adopt a hybrid model, 
rejecting both of these prior models of the arbitration process.  Under 
Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrators are not free to follow their own views of public 
policy (or “industrial justice,” using the labor arbitration terminology).  
They cannot act as amiable compositeurs.  Yet they lack the authority of 
common law courts to formulate default rules.  Apparently, arbitrators 
can interpret contracts and follow statutory or court-developed default 
rules, but lack the same authority to develop common-law default rules 
as judges. 154 
In so holding, the Court effectively set out an institutional hierarchy 
for arbitrators in determining the appropriate procedural default rule.  
Initially, of course, if the parties expressly agree to permit a particular 
procedure, there is no need to turn to a default rule at all.155  The parties’ 
arbitration agreement controls the issue, as long as the agreement is not 
illegal.156 
The parties’ agreement certainly includes any specific procedural 
provisions they set out in their arbitration clause or other written 
arbitration agreement.  It also would include the provisions of any 
institutional rules that the parties incorporate by reference into their 
arbitration agreement.  Finally, customary practice in the particular type 
of arbitration—usage of trade in UCC parlance—also can be part of the 
 
153.  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).   
154.  Obviously, each of these models, like all models, oversimplifies reality.  The cases 
in the different eras reflect some aspects of both models, not any one exclusively.  But the 
models do, we believe, help in portraying how the Supreme Court seems to have viewed 
arbitration in the different eras, and how Stolt-Nielsen opinion seems to take yet another 
approach. 
155.  Although it is very unusual for pre-dispute arbitration agreements to provide for 
class arbitration, such agreements do exist.  E.g., Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 36, at 109. 
156.  Certainly if federal law precludes a particular arbitration procedure, the mandatory 
rule of federal law would override the parties’ agreement.  E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (2006) 
(“[T]he arbitrator shall provide the parties to such contract with a written explanation of the 
factual and legal basis for the award.”).  If state law prohibits a particular arbitration 
procedure, the mandatory rule of state law would override the parties’ agreement only if the 
state law is not preempted by the FAA. 
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parties’ agreement.157  The Court noted the seeming lack of any custom 
authorizing class arbitration in the admiralty context in Stolt-Nielsen.  
But in other contexts, and as to other procedures, there may in fact be a 
customary practice that becomes part of the parties’ agreement.158 
But if the parties have not agreed to a particular procedure—i.e., 
there is in fact a gap in the contract (as the parties stipulated in Stolt-
Nielsen)—the decision suggests its own list of permissible sources to fill 
the gap.  At the top of the list is the legislature—Congress, by enacting 
the FAA, and state legislatures (subject to as yet undecided issues of 
FAA preemption) might have enacted a provision setting out a default 
rule.  In Stolt-Neilsen, the Court faulted the arbitrators for not looking 
to either the FAA or applicable state law for determining the default 
rule.  In addition, presumably court decisions adopting gap-fillers would 
be a permitted source of gap-fillers.  Those decisions, whether 
interpreting the state arbitration statute or relying on the common law 
authority of judges to fashion gap-fillers, would also be part of state law. 
What is not permitted under Stolt-Nielsen, however, is for the 
arbitrators themselves to determine the default rule in the manner of a 
common law judge.159  In this respect, the case represents a bit of a 
watershed decision because, with few exceptions, most courts (in the 
United States and elsewhere) have not vacated arbitral awards on the 
basis of a procedural determination by the arbitrator as to a matter 
where the agreement was silent.160 
 
157.  U.C.C. § 1-303(c) (2010). 
158.  There also is a hierarchy of terms within these sources of the parties’ agreement.  
Presumably the express terms of the arbitration clause govern over the institutional 
arbitration rules and customary practice, and the institutional rules govern over customary 
practice.  One caveat is that the arbitration institution itself is a contracting party, so that 
courts should be cautious not to impose the terms of the parties’ arbitration clause onto a 
nonconsenting institution. 
159.  Although Stolt-Nielsen did not deal with a decision by the arbitrators on the merits 
of the case, its rationale—that arbitrators lack the authority of common law courts to make 
decisions on the basis of public policy—raises questions about arbitrators’ authority to fill 
gaps in contracts and statutes on substantive issues.  The Court has repeatedly stated that 
“[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights 
afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.”  E.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).  But if 
arbitrators lack the gap-filling authority of common law courts, might not parties be forgoing 
substantive rights by agreeing to arbitration? 
160.  Until Stolt-Nielsen, there were two primary exceptions to this general trend.  First, 
courts sometimes vacated awards when a procedural decision by the arbitrator interfered with 
a party’s opportunity to be heard (such as a refusal by the arbitrator to continue a hearing in 
order to accommodate the schedule of a key witness).  See, e.g., Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, 
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2.  Arbitrator Authority after a Court Vacates an Award 
After vacating the award, the Stolt-Nielsen Court set out what it saw 
as its options for proceeding—either remand the matter to the 
arbitrators or decide the matter itself—and attributed those options to 
Section 10(b) of the FAA.161  But in doing so, the Court badly 
misconstrued Section 10(b).162  That section provides that “[i]f an award 
is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award 
to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a 
rehearing by the arbitrators.”163  Thus, Section 10(b) permits a court 
after vacating an award, at its option (and if timely), to direct a 
rehearing by the original arbitrators.164 
Section 10(b) is necessary because, ordinarily, when arbitrators issue 
their award, their authority to take further actions ends—they become, 
in the Latin, functus officio.165  Unless the parties agree otherwise, or an 
arbitration statute directs them to continue, the arbitrators have no 
authority to reopen the matter.166  Unlike trial courts, arbitrators cannot 
entertain petitions for rehearing on the merits of an award.  And they 
certainly do not stand ready for a case to be remanded to them if their 
award is vacated by a court.  As a result, Section 10(b) provides 
 
Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 17–18 (2d Cir. 1997).  This ground finds firm foundation in both the FAA 
and most other country’s arbitral laws, which expressly list it among the possible grounds for 
vacatur.  See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (2006); U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 36 
(1985) (amended 2006).  Second, courts occasionally (but rarely) have vacated or refused to 
enforce awards where the arbitrator rendered fundamentally inconsistent procedural orders 
(the classic case is one in which the arbitrator informed a party that it need not present 
certain evidence, and then found against that party due to its failure to supply that evidence).  
Cf. Iran Aircraft Indus. v. Avco Corp., 980 F.2d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 1992) (refusing to enforce 
award under analogous provisions of Article V of the New York Convention). 
161.  130 S. Ct. at 1770.  Nothing in the opinion limits the Court’s holding on this issue to 
procedural gap-filling.  Given, however, that the decision conflicts with a number of the 
Court’s prior opinions, one possible way to avoid the conflict would be to limit Stolt-Nielsen’s 
holding in this respect to procedural gap-filling, or perhaps even class arbitration issues. 
162.  Justice Ginsburg made this point in dissent, albeit only briefly.  Id. at 1782 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
163.  Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2006).  The Stolt-Nielsen Court does not 
address the timing requirement in the statute, but nothing in the arbitration clause or the 
AAA Class Arbitration Rules specify a time in which a clause construction award must be 
made.   
164.  Id. 
165.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “functus officio” as “without further authority or 
legal competence because the duties and functions of the original commission have been fully 
accomplished.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 743 (9th ed. 2009). 
166.  E.g., GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2517 (2009) 
(identifying as exceptions minor matters such as clerical errors). 
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necessary authority for a court to remand a case to the arbitrators for a 
rehearing. 
But, contrary to the Court’s assertion in Stolt-Nielsen, Section 10(b) 
says nothing about a court having the option to go ahead and decide an 
issue for itself if it does not remand to the arbitrators, whether only one 
outcome is possible or not.  Rather, the Court’s assertion of such an 
option is flatly contrary to established law167—and, indeed, contrary to 
the Court’s own decision in Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. 
Garvey, cited by the Court elsewhere in its Stolt-Nielsen opinion,168 in 
which the Court summarily reversed a lower court for doing exactly 
what the Court did in Stolt-Nielsen.169 
Certainly, Section 10(b) does not require a court to remand a case to 
the arbitrators.170  Instead, the court’s other option is simply to do 
nothing after vacating an award.  If the parties’ first effort to arbitrate 
 
167.  Id. at 2699–2700 (“[T]he annulment of an award should have no effect on the 
parties’ underlying agreement to arbitrate.  That agreement subsists even if an arbitral 
tribunal engaged in procedural misconduct or manifestly misapplied the law.”); GARY B. 
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 
710–11 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter BORN (2001)] (“When a court vacates an arbitral award on 
one of the grounds (other than lack of an arbitration agreement or non-arbitrability) set forth 
in § 10, it may not also resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute.  That dispute generally 
remains subject to the parties’ underlying arbitration agreement and therefore cannot be 
litigated (save where the award was vacated on the grounds that no valid arbitration 
agreement covered the parties’ dispute).”); JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶ 25-61, at 682 (2003) (“If an award is set 
aside for reasons other than invalidity of the arbitration agreement, the agreement would 
survive the award and the parties would still be bound to have their disputes settled by 
arbitration.”); IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 42.1.1.1, at 42:2 to 
42:3 (1994) (“Where the award is vacated and not remanded, . . . [m]ost often the parties are 
left legally where they were before the arbitration, that is to say unresolved disputes exist 
subject to an arbitration clause.  Thus the parties may or may not negotiate in hopes of 
settlement, but if they do not settle and one party wants to pursue the dispute, the forum for 
doing so will normally remain arbitration.”); see also UNIF. ARB. ACT § 12(c) (amended 
1956); UNIF. ARB. ACT § 23(c) (2000). 
168.  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010). 
169.  532 U.S. 504, 511–12 (2001) (per curiam) (“[E]stablished law ordinarily precludes a 
court from resolving the merits of the parties’ dispute on the basis of its own factual 
determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.  Even when the 
arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated, the appropriate remedy is to remand the case for 
further arbitration proceedings.”); see also United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 
484 U.S. 29, 40 n.10 (1987) (“Even in the very rare instances when an arbitrator’s procedural 
aberrations rise to the level of affirmative misconduct, . . . the court should simply vacate the 
award, thus leaving open the possibility of further proceedings if they are permitted under the 
terms of the agreement.”). 
170.  See Peter Bowman Rutledge et al., United States, in PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 877, 935–36 (Frank-Bernd Weigand ed., 
2d ed. 2009).  
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their dispute fails because a court vacates the award, the parties are free 
to arbitrate again, before a different set of arbitrators, to see if those 
arbitrators can make an enforceable award.  The parties still have an 
arbitration agreement, and the dispute is still subject to that agreement.  
For all of the Supreme Court’s stated concern in Stolt-Nielsen (and in 
Rent-A-Center as well) for respecting the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, 
it wholly disregards that agreement in deciding itself whether the parties 
agreed to class arbitration. 
The only exception to this well-established approach is if the ground 
on which the award was vacated casts doubt on the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement.  Thus, if a court vacates an award on the ground 
that the arbitrators exceeded their authority because the parties had 
never agreed to arbitrate the matter, or because the claim could not be 
arbitrated as a matter of federal law, then the arbitration agreement 
would not constrain the court from deciding the issue itself.171  But that 
was not the case in Stolt-Nielsen.  The arbitration agreement at issue was 
the second, supplemental agreement to arbitrate, and nothing in the 
Court’s decision cast the slightest doubt on the enforceability of that 
agreement. 
At bottom, the Court’s decision to determine the default rule itself 
wholly disregards the parties’ agreement to have the arbitrators resolve 
that issue.  Fortunately, only rarely do courts vacate arbitration awards, 
so that the opportunities for courts to disregard arbitration agreements 
because they find the issue to be arbitrated “clear” are uncommon.  But 
the decision in Stolt-Nielsen is a dramatic departure from prior 
precedent even as to that unusual of an occurrence. 
3.  Default Rule of “No Class Arbitration” 
At its heart, Stolt-Nielsen was about gap-filling—determining the 
appropriate default rule when the arbitration agreement is silent about 
class arbitration.  The Supreme Court held that the default rule is that 
class arbitration is not permitted, explaining that class arbitration is 
sufficiently different from individual arbitration that the parties must 
agree as a contractual matter to override that default rule. 
Here, again, the Stolt-Nielsen Court’s decision that arbitrators lack 
the authority to fashion default rules has important implications for the 
types of default rules that will result.  The FAA was enacted in 1925, 
and lacks many of the detailed gap-filling provisions of more modern 
 
171.  BORN (2001), supra note 167, at 710–11; MACNEIL, supra note 167, at 42:3 to 42:4. 
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arbitration statutes.  And even modern arbitration statutes lack gap-
fillers on some issues, such as, for example, class arbitration.  By limiting 
arbitrators to statutory gap-fillers (or court decisions, if any), Stolt-
Nielsen may result in arbitrators adopting what might be called 
“negative gap-fillers”: when the governing legal authorities are silent on 
a particular procedure, that silence will preclude arbitrators from 
adopting the procedure. 
Perhaps courts will limit Stolt-Nielsen to class arbitration.  Most 
arbitration rules, which are incorporated by reference into the parties’ 
agreement, grant arbitrators broad discretion to manage the arbitration 
proceeding.172  In other areas, such rules might be construed to grant 
arbitrators authority to fill procedural gaps.  With respect to class 
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decision in Stolt-Nielsen, with its restriction on arbitrator authority to 
formulate gap-fillers, makes the issue that much more salient. 
C.  How Do Arbitrators Decide Whether Parties Have  
Agreed to Class Arbitration? 
The positive question we are interested in is how arbitrators decide 
whether parties have agreed to regulate a procedural matter in their 
contract—in other words, is there a gap, and, if so, how is it filled?  On 
what evidence do arbitrators rely, and to what sources do arbitrators 
turn, in filling procedural gaps? 
At a more practical level, the most immediate question after Stolt-
Nielsen is—what is left of class arbitration?  Given the Court’s decision 
in Stolt-Nielsen, how likely are arbitrators to find that the parties have 
agreed to have the arbitration proceed on a class basis?  In Stolt-Nielsen, 
the Court did not answer the question of what sort of evidence would be 
sufficient to show that the parties agreed to class arbitration.  As the 
Court stated: “We have no occasion to decide what contractual basis 
may support a finding that the parties agreed to authorize class 
arbitration.”178  But the Court made clear that the mere fact that the 
parties agreed to arbitrate does not, itself, constitute an agreement to 
class arbitration.179  So what evidence might suffice —and, equally 
importantly—how available is such evidence likely to be? 
To get some insight into the answers to both sets of questions, we 
looked at class arbitration proceedings administered by the AAA under 
its class arbitration rules.  As noted by the Supreme Court in Stolt-
Nielsen, the AAA makes available on its web page information on class 
arbitration proceedings it administers, including clause construction 
awards issued by arbitrators in the proceedings.180  We divide our 
analysis into pre-Stolt-Nielsen and post-Stolt-Nielsen cases and awards. 
  
 
See also infra text accompanying notes 225–27. 
178.  130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 n.10 (2010). 
179.  Id. at 1775 (“An implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration, however, 
is not a term that the arbitrator may infer solely from the fact of the parties’ agreement to 
arbitrate.”). 
180.  American Arbitration Association, Searchable Class Arbitration Docket, 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited May 16, 2011) [hereinafter AAA, Searchable 
Docket].  Although the parties in Stolt-Nielsen agreed to follow the AAA class arbitration 
rules, the AAA itself did not administer the arbitration and so filings in the case are not 
available on the AAA web page.  Instead, the award in the Stolt-Nielsen case is reprinted in 
an Appendix to the Petition for Certiorari.  See supra note 138. 
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1.  Pre-Stolt-Nielsen Awards 
We collected a random sample of the clause construction awards 
available on the AAA web site as of July 1, 2010, and reviewed the 
arbitrators’ reasoning in those cases.181 
The awards followed four main approaches in analyzing whether the 
arbitration agreement “permitted” class arbitration, as specified in the 
AAA class arbitration rules.182  A small number of awards (2 of 22, or 
9.1%) relied on express language in the arbitration agreement that the 
arbitrators interpreted as authorizing class arbitration.  The language 
required some interpretation (that is, it did not state that “this 
agreement authorizes arbitration to proceed on a class basis,” for 
example).  But the reading adopted by the arbitrators did not appear to 
be unreasonable, and was based on language unique to the agreement at 
issue.  These awards, while decided before Stolt-Nielsen, likely would 
survive application of the Court’s analytical framework in that case. 
At the other extreme, a greater number of awards (9 of 22, or 
41.0%) concluded that the arbitration agreement did not forbid class 
arbitration, sometimes bolstered by construing the agreement against 
the party that drafted it.  This analysis pretty clearly would not be 
sufficient to satisfy the standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Stolt-
Nielsen.  The arbitrators concluded only that the agreement did not 
preclude class arbitration, not that the agreement authorized it. 
A possible explanation for the reasoning in this group of awards is 
that the issue presented in Bazzle differed from the issue presented in 
Stolt-Nielsen (and most commonly addressed by arbitrators proceeding 
under the AAA class arbitration rules).  The Bazzle plurality directed 
the arbitrators to decide whether the arbitration agreement in that case 
forbade class arbitration.183  If it did, then the South Carolina Supreme 
Court’s attempt to use a state-law gap-filler was inappropriate because 
there was no gap to fill.  By contrast, in Stolt-Neilsen and cases like it, 
the arbitrators are affirmatively deciding whether class arbitration can 
proceed.  Finding that the arbitration clause does not forbid class 
arbitration is only a partial answer to that question and unlikely to be 
 
181.  Our sample consists of twenty-four clause construction awards chosen at random 
from the clause construction awards available on the AAA web page.  Of the twenty-four 
awards, twenty-two (or 91.7%) concluded that the arbitration clause permitted class 
arbitration and two (or 8.3%) concluded that the arbitration clause did not permit class 
arbitration.  The results in the text are based on the twenty-two awards concluding that the 
arbitration clause permitted class arbitration. 
182.  See supra text accompanying notes 125–26. 
183.  See supra text accompanying notes 117–23. 
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sufficient in the post-Stolt-Nielsen world. 
A slightly stronger case can be made for another group of awards (8 
of 22, or 36.4%), in which the arbitrators (unlike those in Stolt-Nielsen, 
at least in the Supreme Court’s view) in fact did construe the arbitration 
agreement.  The analysis in these awards began with the broad language 
of the arbitration agreement, providing that “any dispute” was subject 
to arbitration.  The arbitrators reasoned that “any dispute” would 
include disputes being arbitrated on a class basis.  Because the parties 
could have, but did not, exclude class arbitration proceedings from the 
broad “any dispute” provision (unlike, in many cases, some other types 
of disputes, which were expressly excluded from the clause), the awards 
concluded that arbitration could proceed on a class basis. 
Although the reasoning of the arbitrators avoided the basis on which 
the Court vacated the award in Stolt-Nielsen (i.e., the arbitrators 
interpreted the agreement rather than relying on their own conceptions 
of public policy), the standard applied by the arbitrators does not satisfy 
Stolt-Nielsen.  A general arbitration clause, according to the Stolt-
Nielsen Court, does not authorize class arbitration because class 
arbitration differs too much from individual arbitration.  It is not clear 
whether awards such as these would be vacated under Stolt-Nielsen.  But 
the arbitrators’ analysis is insufficient under that case. 
A final group of awards, relatively small in size (3 of 22, or 13.6%), 
took an approach that might satisfy Stolt-Nielsen, subject to one 
unknown.  After concluding that the arbitration agreements did not 
forbid class arbitration (i.e., that there was a gap), these awards looked 
to state law (usually either California or South Carolina) to fill that gap.  
Under the law of those states, unlike the FAA as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court in Stolt-Nielsen, the default rule was that class 
arbitration was permitted.  As such, the awards avoided the basis for 
vacatur in Stolt-Nielsen by looking to state law gap-fillers rather than the 
arbitrators’ own conception of public policy.  The unknown, on which 
the Court granted certiorari in Bazzle and did not address either in that 
case or in Stolt-Nielsen, is whether the FAA preempts those state law 
gap-fillers.184  If so, then the analysis in these awards, too, would fail. 
Overall, then, the AAA’s clause construction awards prior to Stolt-
Nielsen did not take a consistent approach to filling procedural gaps in 
arbitration agreements.  Despite their substantial agreement as to 
outcome (that the arbitration agreements permitted class arbitration), 
 
184.  See supra text accompanying notes 110–11. 
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the rationales underlying the awards differ in important ways, such that 
only some are likely to survive after Stolt-Nielsen. 
One additional note: keep in mind that the AAA will not administer 
class arbitrations when the arbitration clause includes a class-arbitration 
waiver, unless a court has ordered the dispute to arbitration.185  So in 
none of the cases in the sample did the arbitration agreement include an 
enforceable class-arbitration waiver.186  One would think that the 
existence of a class-arbitration waiver would be pretty good evidence 
that the parties have not agreed to class arbitration—even if the waiver 
is later held unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable by a court.187  
On the other hand, arbitrators might still be able to rely on state law 
gap-fillers in such cases, unless those gap-fillers are preempted by the 
FAA as construed in Stolt-Nielsen. 
 
185.  See supra text accompanying note 129.  In a handful of awards, a court had ordered 
the case to arbitration on the ground that the class-arbitration waiver in the agreement was 
unenforceable, or at least that the arbitrators had to decide that issue. 
186.  Note that the available empirical evidence suggests that the use of class-arbitration 
waivers varies significantly depending on the type of contract at issue:  
 
 A report recently released by the Consumer Arbitration Task 
Force of the Searle Civil Justice Institute addresses precisely that 
question.  The data show that many consumer arbitrations administered 
by the American Arbitration Association arise out of contracts that do 
not preclude class relief in arbitration. . . .  The two types of businesses 
with the highest usage of class arbitration waivers—both with 100% of the 
cases in the sample arising out of clauses including class arbitration 
waivers—were credit card issuers (26 of 26) and cell phone companies (5 
of 5) . . . .  By comparison, the use of class arbitration waivers was mixed 
in car sales contracts (34 of 64, or 53.1%) and contracts with home 
builders (11 of 17, or 64.7%).  And the use of class arbitration waivers was 
nonexistent in real estate brokerage agreements and in the contract of the 
single casualty insurer in the sample.  Indeed, the substantial majority of 
cases (190 of 299, or 64.5%) in the sample did not arise out of an 
arbitration clause with a class arbitration waiver.  While the results are 
limited to AAA consumer arbitrations, they nonetheless identify a 
significant set of consumer arbitration clauses that do not include class 
arbitration waivers. 
Drahozal & Ware, supra note 34, at 472–73 (footnotes omitted). 
187.  E.g., Fensterstock v. Educ. Fin. Partners, 611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010):  
 
Our conclusion that a given agreement is invalid and unenforceable does 
not mean that the parties in fact reached the opposite agreement.  Thus, 
excising the Note’s class action and class arbitration waiver clause leaves 
the Note silent as to the permissibility of class-based arbitration, and 
under Stolt-Nielsen we have no authority to order class-based arbitration. 
Id. 
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2.  Post-Stolt-Nielsen Cases and Awards 
As of January 1, 2011, over eight months had passed since the 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen.  Subsequent events provide even better insights 
into the likely effect of the case on the future of class arbitration and on 
how arbitrators are likely to fill gaps in arbitration agreements.  Two 
points are noteworthy. 
First, filings of new class arbitration cases before the AAA appear to 
have almost completely dried up.  Based on cases posted on the AAA’s 
class arbitration web site, only one new class arbitration claim was filed 
with the AAA in the eight months after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Stolt-Nielsen.188  By comparison, at least five cases were filed during the 
first four months of 2010 and at least thirty-three cases were filed during 
2009.189 
Second, as of January 1, 2011, arbitrators have filed awards 
construing arbitration agreements in eight cases since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen.190  In five of those eight awards (62.5% 
 
188.  See Employment Arbitration Rules, Demand for Arbitration, Schuh v. Johnny 
Utah 51 LLC (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 23, 2010), available at http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6226.  
Between January 1, 2011, and April 12, 2011, two additional class arbitration claims were 
posted to the AAA’s web site.  One was a class counterclaim that had been filed on March 26, 
2010.  See Demand for Class Arbitration, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. v. Bhakti, LLC, Case 
No. 71 148 00796 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Mar. 26, 2010), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=6338.  In the second, the class arbitration demand was signed by plaintiff’s counsel 
on April 26, 2010, the day before Stolt-Nielsen was decided, and received by the AAA on 
April 28, 2010, the day after Stolt-Nielsen was decided.  Commercial Arbitration Rules, 
Demand for Arbitration, Garrett-Scheier v. Muller Auto. Group, Inc., Case No. 11 155 00892 
10 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6339.  The case was later 
suspended for nonpayment of fees.  Suspension Order of the Arbitrator, Garrett-Scheier v. 
Muller Automotive Group, Inc., Case No. 11 155 00892 10 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Dec. 9, 2010) 
(Bissell, Arb.), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6340.  Given the long lags in posting these class 
arbitration demands, it may be that the apparent dearth of filings since Stolt-Nielsen reflects 
posting delays rather than an actual decline in case filings.  At the very least, we cannot 
exclude that possibility from the information available on the AAA’s web site. 
189.  Authors’ calculations based on data collected from the AAA’s Searchable Class 
Action Docket.  AAA, Searchable Docket, supra note 180.  Even that number was a decrease 
from previous years.  William K. Slate II & Eric P. Tuchmann, Class Action Arbitrations, 11 
INT’L ARB. L. REV. 50, 53 (2008) (reporting data “for the period October 8, 2003 through 
January 1, 2008”) (“Filings by year are as follows: 2003, 6 cases filed; 2004, 65 cases; 2005, 47 
cases; 2006, 58 cases; 2007, 41 cases.”). 
190. SWLA Hosp. Assocs. v. Corvel Corp., Case No. 11 193 02760 06 (Am. Arb. Ass’n 
Sept. 3, 2010) (Gary, Moreland, & Baker Arbs.) (dissenting opinion by Baker), 
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6212; Demetriou v. EarthLink, Inc., Case No. 11 117 00273 10 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n Sept. 1, 2010) (Hare, Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6349; Spradlin v. Trump 
Ruffin Tower I, LLC, Case No. 11 115 Y 01846 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n Aug. 10, 2010) (LaMothe, 
Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6232; Clark v. CHDP Condo, LLP, Case No. 11 115 Y 01921 09 
(Am. Arb. Ass’n July 21, 2010) (Hendrick, Harr, & Dreier Arbs.), 
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of the time), the arbitrator(s) construed the arbitration clause as 
authorizing class arbitration.191  The percentage of awards permitting 
class arbitrations to proceed has declined substantially following Stolt-
Nielsen.192  Moreover, the analysis in the awards changed as well, 
focusing much more on state law and contract language and much less 
on awards in prior cases (which almost never are discussed in the post-
Stolt-Nielsen awards).193  It is unclear whether the analysis in the awards 
will stand up to review in courts that are applying Stolt-Nielsen.194  But if 
nothing else the awards provide some evidence that class arbitration 
might persist after Stolt-Nielsen. 
 
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6254; Owens v. Auto. Prot. Corp., Case No. 11 188 01140 05 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n July 19, 2010) (Green, Arb.), http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6221; Mensch v. Alta 
Colleges, Inc., Case No. 11 516 00995 09 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 16, 2010) (Baker, Arb.), 
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6146; Benson v. CSA-Credit Solutions of America, Inc., Case No. 11-
160-M-02281-08 (Am. Arb. Ass’n July 6, 2010) (Meyerson, Arb.), 
http://adr.org/si.asp?id=6139; Knudsen v. North Motors, Inc., Case No. 11 155 02699 09 (Am. 
Arb. Ass’n May 18, 2010) (Daerr-Bannon, Arb.), http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6236; see also 
Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc. v. Passow, No. 10-11498-EFH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
4495, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011) (stating that, after Stolt-Nielsen, arbitrator had reaffirmed 
clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to class arbitration) (decision 
reaffirming award not available on AAA web page). 
191.  Knudsen, at 1; Benson, at 8; Owens, at 56; SWLA, at 1; Demetriou, at 1. 
192.  See supra note 181. 
193.  One award rejects reliance on prior arbitration awards as evidence of a custom or 
usage of class arbitration in the industry.  Mensch, at 30. 
194.  We do not analyze post-Stolt-Nielsen court cases in detail here.  That said, it is 
worth noting that courts have dealt with the availability of class arbitration in varied ways 
since Stolt-Nielsen, including some courts that have refused to vacate clause construction 
awards finding that the parties had agreed to class arbitration (and some that have vacated 
such awards).  For exemplary cases, see Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Dub Herring Ford, 
623 F.3d 348, 349–50 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s dismissal of motion to confirm 
class certification award for lack of jurisdiction); Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, 
611 F.3d 124, 141 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that parties did not agree to class arbitration, based 
in part on unconscionable class-arbitration waiver); Smith & Wollensky Rest. Group, Inc. v. 
Passow, No. 10-11498-EFH, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4495, at *3–4 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2011) 
(refusing to vacate clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to class 
arbitration); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 2d 444, 449–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(memorandum order indicating that court would follow Stolt-Nielsen and vacate clause 
construction award permitting class arbitration); Jock v. Sterling Jewelers, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 
2875 (JSR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80896, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2010) (vacating clause 
construction award for reasons stated in prior memorandum order), and La. Health Serv. 
Indem. Co. v. Gambro A B, No. 05-1450, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135579, at *22 (W.D. La. 
Dec. 21, 2010) (refusing to vacate clause construction award finding that parties had agreed to 
class arbitration).  
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D.  What is the Optimal Institutional Approach to  
Procedural Gap-Filling in Arbitration? 
The normative questions raised by Stolt-Nielsen are twofold.  First, 
and more narrowly, did the Court properly determine that the default 
rule should be that arbitration on a class basis is not permitted?  Second, 
and more generally, what is the optimal authority of arbitrators to 
develop default rules—i.e., should they be restricted to statutory or 
court-developed gap-fillers or permitted to develop default rules in the 
same manner as common law courts?  We address those issues in turn, 
after first describing the standard normative analysis of default rules. 
1.  Normative Analysis of Default Rules 
The normative analysis of arbitrator gap-filling tracks to a 
substantial degree the normative analysis of default rules more 
generally.  In simplest terms, because the rules are default rules, an 
important part of identifying the optimal rule is identifying the rule that 
will cause parties to incur the lowest transacting costs—the rule that 
most parties would otherwise have contracted for, so that they do not 
have to incur the costs of bargaining around the default.195 
Such a majoritarian theory of default rules is based on a particular 
view of contractual incompleteness.  The implicit assumption of such a 
theory, as Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner explain, is that contracts are 
incomplete because the transaction costs of bargaining for complete 
contracts are too high.196  Ayres and Gertner identify a variety of 
considerations in determining the appropriate default rule based on 
“minoritarian” rather than majoritarian considerations: “different 
private costs of contracting around”; “different private costs of failing to 
contract around”; “different public costs of filling gaps”; and “ignorance 
of the law.”197  Thus, for example, the public costs of filling gaps are 
higher when the gap-filler is a default standard rather than a default 
rule.198  Or, when some parties are less likely to contract around the 
default than others (such as when one party is less well informed about 
the law than the other), all else equal “lawmakers should tend to favor 
 
195.  For further discussion, see generally Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 109, 
at 87; Ayres & Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 109, at 729. 
196.  Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1592 (1999). 
197.  Id. at 1593. 
198.  Id. at 1596; see Francesco Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC CHOICE 510, 510 (Charles K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004) (defining 
rules and standards).   
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as defaults the preferred rules of contractors who have a relatively low 
propensity to contract around other defaults.”199 
A final200 (and somewhat related) consideration is the tailoring of the 
gap-filler: as George Geis asks, “[s]hould lawmakers pick just one 
simple default rule for an entire legal system, or should they design 
more complex default rules to offer customized legal treatment for 
different markets—or even for different parties?”201  A single simple 
default rule would have the lowest public cost of promulgating the gap-
filler in the first instance.  But if the optimal majoritarian default would 
differ systematically for discrete market segments, it may be that a more 
complex default rule, one that varied across the markets, might reduce 
the transacting costs of the parties (who otherwise would have to 
contract around the rule) so as to outweigh the increased public costs of 
adopting a more tailored rule. 
2.  Default Rules and Class Arbitration 
As for the “no class arbitration” default rule adopted in Stolt-
Nielsen, it arguably is defensible as a majoritarian default, at least for 
commercial contracts.  As discussed above, while class arbitration has 
been around for a long time, only in recent years has it become at all 
common (if sixty-five cases a year counts as being common).202  
Although they do exist, express contract provisions permitting 
arbitration on a class basis are rare.203  By comparison, many contracts—
particularly those in industries in which class actions are common—
include class-arbitration waivers, seeking to preclude arbitration from 
proceeding on a class basis.  By contrast, as illustrated in the previous 
section, arbitrators almost unanimously filled gaps prior to Stolt-Nielsen 
by holding that class arbitration was permissible, and continue to do so 
in a significant proportion of cases even after Stolt-Nielsen.204  But those 
 
199.  Ayres & Gertner, supra note 196 at 1602–03. 
200.  An additional issue we do not address here is what Professor Ayres calls “altering 
rules”—“the necessary and sufficient conditions for contracting around a default.”  Ian Ayres, 
Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 6 (2006).  Rent-A-Center, for example, might be 
understood as addressing what is necessary for parties to contract around the default 
allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators. 
201.  George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1109, 1110 (2006); see also Ian Ayres, Preliminary Thoughts on Optimal 
Tailoring of Contractual Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 1–3 (1993). 
202.  See Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 189, at 53 (reporting AAA class arbitration 
caseloads for 2003–2008). 
203.  See supra note 155. 
204.  See supra text accompanying notes 182–94. 
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awards often did not attempt to determine what the parties would have 
contracted for in a world of no transaction costs, and were limited to 
cases in which the parties’ arbitration agreement was silent as to class 
arbitration (thus providing only a partial look at parties’ contracting 
practices).  Plus, most, although not all, awards were in disputes 
between sophisticated and unsophisticated parties, not between two 
commercial parties.  Accordingly, at least for commercial contracts, a 
default rule of no class arbitration would seem to be the optimal default, 
consistent with Stolt-Nielsen. 
For consumer and (most) employment contracts, the analysis is more 
complicated.  It is more difficult to draw inferences from standard form 
contracts about the optimal majoritarian default, and consumers and 
employees are less likely to contract around a default rule than 
commercial parties.  The costs to businesses of contracting around a 
default rule that permitted class arbitration would be relatively low—
since the contracts typically are standard form contracts prepared by the 
business, which may well be revised periodically for other reasons as 
well.  And a default rule permitting class arbitration could be tailored 
fairly easily to groups such as consumers and some employees by 
limiting Stolt-Nielsen to contracts between sophisticated parties. 
On the other hand, to the extent businesses perceive that reducing 
the risk of class actions is a reason to use arbitration clauses, they will 
quickly contract around a default rule permitting class arbitration—
incurring the transaction costs (however slight) of doing so.  If, in fact, 
for policy reasons class relief should be available for consumers and 
employees in arbitration, implementing that policy choice will likely 
need to be done by a mandatory rule, rather than a default rule.205 
  
 
205.  Some have suggested that the decision in Stolt-Nielsen will increase the likelihood 
that Congress will enact the Arbitration Fairness Act.  E.g., Vinson & Elkins LLP, Supreme 
Court Strikes Down Arbitrators’ Decision Allowing Class Action Arbitration (Apr. 28, 2010), 
http://www.vinson-elkins.com/resources/SupremeCourtStrikesArbitratorsDecisionAllowing 
ClassArbitration.aspx (last visited May 16, 2011); James P. Duffy IV & Ian Mahoney, Stolt-
Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International: Supreme Court Raises the Hurdle for Class Action 
Arbitration, May 3, 2010, http://www.dlapiper.com/stolt-nielsen-v-animalfeeds-
international:supreme-court-raises-the-hurdle-for-class-action-arbitration.  As a policy 
matter, however, even if Stolt-Nielsen is extended to consumer and employment contracts, it 
would at most justify a much narrower statutory change, such as a mandatory rule permitting 
class arbitration or the exclusion of class actions from arbitration.   
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3.  Default Rules and Arbitrator Gap-Filling 
The broader implications of Stolt-Nielsen, however, are more 
troubling for arbitration law.  If the case is applied to limit the 
procedural gap-filling authority of arbitrators in areas beyond class 
arbitration, parties will incur added costs of contracting around the 
resulting negative default rules, as well as the costs of greater 
uncertainty about the enforceability of their arbitration agreements and 
awards. 
In recent years, several commentators have argued for vesting less 
procedural discretion in adjudicators (including both judges and 
arbitrators), an approach that would seem consistent with the Court’s 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen.  Robert G. Bone challenges the “pervasive 
assumption that expert trial judges can do a good job of tailoring 
procedures to individual cases [a]s empirically unsupported and at best 
highly questionable.”206  Instead, he argues for a greater use of rules 
restricting judicial discretion—not “deliver[ing] a knock-out punch to 
discretion,” but contending that rule makers should balance the costs 
and benefits of discretion, “taking account of all of the costs of case-
specific discretion and all the benefits of limiting discretion in various 
ways, and that they should publicly justify the choices they make.”207 
William M. Park similarly argues for restricting procedural 
discretion, this time specifically for arbitrators.  He states that “the 
benefits of arbitrator discretion are overrated; flexibility is not an 
unalloyed good; and arbitration’s malleability often comes at an 
unjustifiable cost.”208  He proposes what he calls a “Rules Rich” rather 
than a “Rules Light” approach: “Rather than a blank page to be 
completed by arbitrators, institutional provisions could contain specific 
protocols that the arbitrator would be required to apply unless modified 
by the agreement of all parties.”209 
In essence, Professor Bone and Professor Park advocate a shift from 
default standards to default rules governing court and arbitral 
procedure, at least in particular circumstances.210  The effect of the 
 
206.  Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007). 
207.  Id. at 1965. 
208.  Park, Arbitration’s Protean Nature, supra note 112, at 283. 
209.  Id. at 289. 
210.  Professor Bone offers five reasons why the terms of arbitration agreements should 
not be taken as evidence in favor of case-specific discretion in litigation:  (1) even if discretion 
is appropriate for arbitrators, it might not be appropriate for judges; (2) parties might not 
include detailed provisions in their arbitration clauses because arbitrators might “follow some 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen may be similar, to the extent 
that the result is an increase in negative default rules—rules that 
preclude exercises of arbitrator authority because the FAA does not 
address a particular issue.211  The normative effects of such a shift reflect 
a tradeoff between the costs of more precise arbitration rules (the cost 
of drafting with greater precision; the cost of unanticipated exceptions 
arising that are not dealt with by the rules; and the cost of more awards 
being overturned due to the failure to comply with the more precise 
rules) and the costs of greater procedural discretion on the part of 
arbitrators (the cost arbitrators incur in deciding how to apply the vague 
standards; the cost of changes in party behavior due to uncertainty as to 
how arbitrators will apply those standards; and the cost of disappointed 
party expectations about the procedural process in arbitration).212 
Determining the optimal degree of discretion given that tradeoff is 
difficult in the abstract, and depends on empirical issues such as the 
frequency with which certain issues arise in arbitration (the more 
frequently issues arise, the lower the drafting costs of rules relative to 
the enforcement costs of arbitrators applying standards).213  That said, 
we are skeptical that an eighty-five-year-old arbitration statute—which 
sets default rules only by its failure to address certain procedural 
issues—better strikes that balance than arbitration institutions through 
 
customary protocol, such as the procedures specified by the American Arbitration 
Association or industry arbitration guidelines”; (3) parties might not include detailed 
contractual provisions not because such provisions are inefficient, but because attempting to 
negotiate such provisions might interfere with making a deal at all; (4) “even in international 
arbitration, parties often agree on procedures after the dispute arises, especially in large-stakes 
arbitrations with sophisticated counsel and skilled arbitrators”; and (5) lawyers, acting with 
bounded rationality, might underestimate the risk of a dispute and spend insufficient time 
contracting for detailed procedures that might actually be beneficial to their clients.  Bone, 
supra note 206, at 1979 n.80.  Some of these reasons overlap with the reasons we identified for 
why parties—even sophisticated parties drafting standard form arbitration agreements—
might not include detailed provisions governing discovery and the like.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 38–42.  And other reasons, while likely true (such as a growing use of 
more detailed customary procedural rules such as the International Bar Association’s Rules 
on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration, see Park, Procedural Default Rules 
Revisited, supra note 112, at 361–62), do not support the use of negative default rules of the 
sort likely to result from Stolt-Nielsen. 
211.  See supra text accompanying note 172.. 
212.  This tradeoff is a variation on the familiar analysis of rules versus standards.  For a 
detailed analysis, see generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992); Parisi, Rules Versus Standards, supra note 198, §§ 2.1–
2.2.  See also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 109, at 594–609 (criticizing use of default standards 
in modern contract law). 
213.  Parisi, supra note 198, § 2. 
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their rules or parties through their arbitration clauses.214 
As such, we think to some degree that the market has spoken in 
favor of more, rather than less, procedural discretion for arbitrators.  
Most arbitration rules give arbitrators broad procedural discretion, and 
few contain express rules on joinder, consolidation, dispositive motions, 
and confidentiality—much less class arbitration.215  Arbitration 
institutions review their rules on a regular basis, with no evidence of a 
shift toward procedural specificity.  It is true that groups such as the 
International Bar Association have adopted more specific procedural 
rules that parties sometimes incorporate into their contracts.216  
Moreover, arbitration agreements have become more detailed over 
time, at least in standard form contracts between sophisticated and 
unsophisticated parties.  Even so, the available empirical evidence does 
not provide a basis for adopting negative default rules of the sort that 
may result from Stolt-Nielsen.  While we do not claim that market 
acceptance, even among sophisticated parties, indicates that an 
approach necessarily is efficient, the substantial competition among 
arbitration institutions—particularly, but not exclusively, in the market 
for international arbitration217—provides some assurance that default 
rules significantly limiting arbitrator discretion would impose net costs 
rather than net benefits on parties. 
In short, our normative analysis supports limiting the Court’s 
decision in Stolt-Nielsen to class arbitration and not applying it to 
constrain the procedural gap-filling powers of arbitrators more 
generally. 
 
214.  Note that Professor Park argues for arbitration institutions to change their standard 
form rules, not for national legislation restricting the discretion of arbitrators.  See Park, 
Arbitration’s Protean Nature, supra note 112, at 289.  In effect, he is participating in the 
market to make it perform better, rather than seeking a legislative change because the market 
is not functioning well. 
215.  See supra text accompanying notes 172–73. 
216.  E.g., INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 3–5 (May 22, 2004), http://www.ibanet.org/ 
Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=E2FE5E72-EB14-4BBA-B10D-D33DAFEE8918; 
INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2–3 (May 29, 2010), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid= 68336C49-4106-46BF-A1C6-
A8F0880444DC. 
217.  Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 98–110 (2000); Peter 
B. Rutledge, Toward a Contractual Approach for Arbitral Immunity, 39 GA. L. REV. 151, 
161–65 (2004). 
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V.  CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE RETURN TO  
CONTRACT AND JURISDICTION 
The greater judicial solicitude for arbitration agreements that took 
root in the early 1970s and fully blossomed by the late 1980s has created 
unprecedented opportunities for parties to enter into “procedural 
contracts.”  Those contracts cover matters far beyond designation of the 
applicable law or exclusive forum.  Whether through explicit terms or 
incorporation of arbitral rules, they also address an array of procedural 
matters such as collective litigation, discovery, limitations periods, 
available remedies, and the allocation of power between courts and 
arbitrators.  When used actively, they can shape the outcome of a 
dispute; when ignored, they arguably create gaps that arbitrators must 
fill subject, potentially, to judicial review. 
This paper has undertaken a systematic examination of these 
procedural contracts, along both positive and normative lines.  As a 
positive matter, we have seen that some parties are increasingly 
exercising their freedom to enter into procedural contracts, though they 
appear more inclined to leave some procedural terms like discovery 
unregulated.  We also found that, despite the regular need for 
arbitrators to exercise their gap-filling authority, they have not 
developed a consistent method for filling gaps in procedural contracts, 
at least as to the availability of class arbitration.  As a normative matter, 
we have favored a system of oversight that relies on a blend of industry 
self-regulation and case-by-case judicial scrutiny, over more blunt 
approaches such as regulation by an administrative agency or outright 
statutory prohibitions.  Finally, we also have misgivings about the 
Supreme Court’s heavy-handedness in Stolt-Nielsen.  While that 
decision can in principle be limited to the precise issue of an arbitrator’s 
authority to order class arbitration in the face of a silent agreement, it 
certainly opens the door for significant post-award litigation over other 
gap-filling determinations by the arbitrator. 
In this conclusion, we trace the implications of our findings for two 
pending matters, one on the judicial agenda and one on the legislative 
agenda.  The first is AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, pending before 
the Supreme Court; the second is the Arbitration Fairness Act. 
A.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Concepcion concerns a nettlesome question under Section 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act—namely whether the FAA preempts a state 
court’s finding that the presence of a class-arbitration waiver in an 
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arbitration clause renders the clause unenforceable?  The underlying 
argument runs as follows: class-arbitration waivers typically are 
contained in contracts between parties of unequal bargaining positions 
(a consumer or employee and a company).  The class-arbitration waiver 
represents an effort by the company to preclude class arbitration against 
the company and, thereby, discourages an injured customer from 
pursuing her claim at all.  Consequently, the class-arbitration waiver 
effectively functions like an exculpatory clause.  For these reasons, the 
argument concludes, the class-arbitration waiver is unconscionable.  
Because unconscionability is a “ground for the revocation of any 
contract” under Section 2, the clause is also unenforceable. 
Viewed through the lens of this paper, Concepcion presents the sort 
of normative question that we explored in Part II, namely the limits on 
the parties’ freedom to enter into procedural contracts.  At one level, 
the argument advanced in Concepcion fits comfortably within the 
normative framework that we defend—namely as a form of case-by-case 
judicial oversight through the use of generally applicable contract 
doctrines under Section 2.  At another level, however, Concepcion 
illustrates how such a framework might be abused.218 
To understand why, imagine if a state legislature enacted a law that 
declared arbitration clauses invalid when they prevented parties from 
participating in class actions in court.  Such a statute would be 
preempted because it would invalidate all arbitration clauses—all 
arbitration clauses prevent parties from participating in class actions in 
court.219  The result would be the same, one would think, regardless of 
whether the state law provided more broadly that all clauses that 
prevent parties from participating in class actions in court are 
preempted (which would apply also to class-action waivers).220  Nor 
should it matter that the state rule was implemented by courts under the 
guise of unconscionability—the rule would be preempted nonetheless.221 
 
218.  At this point in the paper, it is appropriate to disclose that one of us (Rutledge) 
served as counsel to an amicus curiae in several cases, including one pending before the 
Florida Supreme Court (Pendergast v. Sprint-Nextel), in which an argument along these lines 
was advanced.  The other of us (Drahozal) provided comments on a draft of the law 
professors’ amicus brief in Concepcion, although he was not a party to the brief.  
219.  See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683–86 (1996); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268–70, 271–72 (1995).   
220.  Drahozal, supra note 111, at 408–10.  
221.  See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).  Counsel for Concepcion 
conceded as much before the Supreme Court.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. argued Nov. 9, 2010) (“[I]s the rule 
tantamount to a rule of non-enforceability of arbitration agreements[?]”). 
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The reason Concepcion is a difficult case is that the state 
unconscionability rule there invalidates class-arbitration waivers, and 
not all arbitration clauses include class-arbitration waivers.222  That said, 
if the state legislature enacted a statute invalidating arbitration clauses 
that included class-arbitration waivers, there is a good doctrinal 
argument that the state statute would be preempted.  Moreover, as a 
theoretical matter, such a law would run afoul of our own framework 
which favors case-by-case judicial oversight over blunt legislative 
prohibitions. 
The use of the unconscionability doctrine in Concepcion still appears 
to be indistinguishable from the above-described (albeit narrower) 
legislative prohibition.  It still attempts to accomplish indirectly, through 
twisting the unconscionability doctrine, what the FAA may preclude 
state legislatures from doing directly.223  Not only is such an outcome 
illogical, it is decidedly undemocratic.  It licenses judges (who may or 
may not be elected) to announce rules under the guise of generally 
applicable state contract law that democratically elected state legislators 
themselves could not.  Moreover, because all this occurs under the guise 
of generally applicable contract law, such arguments—unless policed—
run the risk of distorting contract doctrines more generally.224 
There is a counterargument that some members of the Court 
appeared sympathetic to during oral argument in Concepcion: that as 
long as the state court would invalidate other waivers of class relief (or 
exculpatory clauses) as unconscionable, the use of the unconscionability 
 
222.  See supra note 186. 
223.  Thus, it is not alone enough that the court uses a generally applicable contract law 
defense such as unconscionability.  It must apply that defense in the same way to arbitration 
agreements as it applies the defense to other contract provisions.  For an easy example of a 
court applying a general contract law defense differently to arbitration clauses than to other 
contract clauses, see Arkansas’ development of a special mutuality requirement for 
arbitration clauses that is not applicable to other contract provisions.  Drahozal, supra note 
111, at 411 n.138.   
224.  Recent research indicates that the litigation over the enforceability of arbitration 
has come to dominate the development of general principles of contract law.  According to 
one recent study, “battles over arbitration clauses likely constitute a plurality of all contract 
cases.”  Horton, The Shadow Terms, supra note 7, at 658; see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, 
The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1449–50 (2008).  Some research suggests that litigation over the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements accounts for the development of most 
unconscionability law, a sharp change from the state of affairs twenty-five years ago.  See 
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of 
Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L. REV. 185, 185–189 (2004).  Recent evidence suggests that 
this volume of litigation has begun to abate, perhaps as the doctrinal gaps are filled.  See 
Bruhl, supra, at 1489. 
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doctrine to invalidate class-arbitration waivers should not be preempted.  
Ironically, it is Stolt-Nielsen, rather than the Supreme Court’s prior 
preemption cases, that underscores the weakness with this argument.  In 
Stolt-Nielsen, the Court held that class arbitration is sufficiently different 
from individual arbitration that an individual arbitration clause cannot 
be construed as permitting class arbitration.225  Yet, when courts hold 
class-arbitration waivers unconscionable, they are essentially turning 
individual arbitration clauses into class arbitration clauses, changing the 
fundamental nature of what the parties agreed to.  A state statute to that 
effect would be preempted under most theories of FAA preemption;226 a 
state court decision applying unconscionability doctrine to that same 
end should be preempted as well.227 
By this, we do not mean to jettison the doctrinal framework that has 
built up around Section 2.  There certainly is a principled way whereby 
courts can apply Section 2’s “generally applicable” contract defense 
standard to arbitration clauses.  Yet Concepcion demonstrates that with 
respect to certain more malleable defenses, like unconscionability and 
public policy, there exists a risk that anti-arbitration courts will contort 
those doctrines to achieve a particular policy outcome.  Unless checked, 
that approach would simply return us to the era of “judicial hostility 
toward arbitration agreements” that the FAA sought to end. 
In sum, while Concepcion is a hard case, in the end we believe that 
the analysis offered in this paper suggests that the petitioners had the 
better of the argument and that the Supreme Court rightly rejected the 
back-door attempt to embed a prohibition against class arbitration 
waivers—i.e., to change the nature of the arbitration proceeding to 
which the parties agreed—in unconscionability doctrine. 
B.  The Arbitration Fairness Act 
For the last several years, members of Congress, especially the 
recently-defeated Senator Russell Feingold, have introduced the 
Arbitration Fairness Act.228  The bill is relatively simple to understand.  
 
225.  See supra notes 177–44 and accompanying text. 
226.  Drahozal, supra note 111, at 422–23.   
227.  Questions by Justices Ginsburg and Alito seemed to suggest this possibility during 
oral argument in Concepcion.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 40–47, AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, No. 09-893 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2010). 
228.  Here, it is appropriate to disclose that we both have testified in congressional 
hearings about the bill.  Rutledge has testified against the bill.  Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 95–113 (2007) (statement of Peter Rutledge), available 
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At bottom, it prohibits pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and 
employment agreements (the bill contains partial definitions of those 
agreements which need not concern us here).229  An earlier version of 
the bill also provided that courts, not arbitrators, will resolve any 
challenges to the arbitration agreement (apparently overruling Prima 
Paint and the First Options “clear and unmistakable” standard).  In its 
current form, the bill operates retroactively—insofar as it applies to 
disputes that arise after the date of its enactment, irrespective of when 
the parties entered into the arbitration agreement. 
Viewed through the lens of this paper, the Arbitration Fairness Act 
also presents the sort of normative question that we explored in Part II, 
namely the limits on the parties’ freedom to enter into procedural 
contracts.  In contrast to Concepcion, the consequences are far different.  
The vesting of exclusive authority in courts to resolve challenges to the 
arbitration agreement curtails the parties’ freedom as to a particular 
provision of their procedural contracts (namely the allocation issue 
discussed in the context of Rent-A-Center).  The outright ban on certain 
types of pre-dispute arbitration agreements does not attack procedural 
contracts directly.  Of course, indirectly, the ban hampers the 
development of procedural contracts by preventing parties from 
agreeing, on a pre-dispute basis, to resolve their disputes extrajudicially 
(much like the non-arbitrability doctrine, discussed in Part I, did, only 
more broadly). 
The Arbitration Fairness Act admittedly presents different sets of 
concerns about inroads on contractual freedom from those we identified 
 
at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Rutledge071025.pdf; The Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
110th Cong. 7–9 (2007) (statement of Peter Rutledge), http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/ 
testimony.cfm?id=3055 &wit_id=6831.  Drahozal testified in the context of presenting the 
findings of the Searle Civil Justice Institute’s study on consumer arbitration.  Arbitration or 
‘Arbitrary’: The Misuse of Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (statement of Christopher R. Drahozal), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/ 
stories/Hearings/pdfs/20090722Drahozal.pdf; Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card 
Industry Using it to Quash Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and 
Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 121–38 (2009) (statement of 
Christopher R. Drahozal). 
229.  Defenders of the bill argue that they do not oppose arbitration, but merely binding 
pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  They contend that, if arbitration really does offer 
comparative advantages over other forms of dispute resolution, then those advantages will 
remain after an actual dispute has arisen and, under the Act, parties remain free to enter into 
post-dispute arbitration agreements.  For an argument that the promise of post-dispute 
arbitration is illusory, see generally Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?  The 
Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267 (2008). 
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in Concepcion.  It does not raise the same legitimacy concerns because 
the bill, if enacted, would be the result of a legislative process.  Nor does 
the bill distort the development of more general contract law; it simply 
modifies the Section 2 standard. 
Nonetheless, under the normative framework we have developed 
here, we think that Congress should not adopt it.  At bottom, the bill, 
however well-intentioned, works too great an inroad on contractual 
freedom without there being a sufficiently compelling empirical case for 
some offsetting benefit.230  The bill puts all employment and consumer 
agreements on the same plane without considering whether the need for 
regulation might vary across types of agreement or within subcategories 
of a single agreement.  Thus, we doubt that a highly paid corporate 
executive whose contract contains an arbitration agreement needs the 
same degree of paternalistic regulation as a line employee.231  As the 
protocols demonstrate, industry self-regulation (coupled with judicial 
oversight) affords a greater opportunity to adapt rules to these nuances 
and avoids the meat-cleaver approach exemplified by the bill. 
A further flaw in the bill is that, if enacted, it would hinder the sort 
of reexamination that should occur in light of new empirical evidence.  
As we have explained in great detail elsewhere, the empirical record on 
arbitration remains incomplete, though important gaps are being filled.  
If the bill is enacted, the risk is that Congress will naturally turn to other 
matters, and occasions for reexamination will be scant.  By contrast, 
through industry self-regulation such as the protocols, the industry itself 
has a natural incentive regularly to reexamine whether the protocols 
sufficiently take into the account the extant empirical evidence.  This 
helps to avoid risks that awards might be declared unenforceable, an 
outcome that arbitral institutions have a natural incentive to avoid.232 
  
 
230.  For discussions of the state of empirical literature on the issues surrounding the 
Arbitration Fairness Act, see generally Drahozal & Zyontz, supra note 88, at 847–62; Peter B. 
Rutledge, Arbitration Reform:  What We Know and What We Need to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 579 (2009). 
231.  See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from 
Legislation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 591, 593–600 (2009). 
232.  A good example of this phenomenon is the debate in the 1990s over the allocation 
of arbitration costs.  See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Cole v. 
Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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C.  Looking Ahead 
This Article has offered a systematic treatment of procedural 
contracts and placed them in the context of contemporary judicial and 
congressional debates.  Much work, however, remains to be done, 
particularly on the empirical side.  Specifically, over the long-run, 
scholars should attempt to develop more sophisticated data sets on the 
terms of procedural contracts, especially datasets like the franchise 
database that permit comparisons of how the use of such terms evolves 
over time.  Furthermore, it is hoped that additional arbitration 
associations, not just the American Arbitration Association, will make 
available databases of arbitration awards so scholars can investigate 
further how arbitrators exercise their gap-filling authority in the face of 
silent procedural contracts.  Finally, future research should unpack the 
causes behind some of the curious trends that our empirical research 
uncovered such as the surprisingly high frequency with which parties 
leave certain terms, like discovery, unregulated in their procedural 
contracts. 
 
